China’s Maritime Strategy: The Pursuit of Regional Dominance
by Arielle Shorr
In November of 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama announced boldly to the Australian parliament during his visit, “Th e United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay,” to announce the U.S.’s expanded Asia-Pacific military presence. The decision to increase U.S. influence by sending aircrafts and 2,500 Marines has been the U.S.’s response to concerns from several allies, such as Japan and Australia, that China would replace the U.S. as the regional hegemon. President Obama assured his audience that despite economic constraints, defense cuts “will not come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific.”Though the President’s visit and speech were allegedly not meant to antagonize China, they were certainly symbolic of the U.S.attempt to reaffirm its position and a growing anxiety over China’s rising maritime ambition and naval capabilities. While China’s navy is decades away from reaching a status on par with that of the U.S., its development of A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) capabilities, such as anti-ship and anti-satellite missiles, present an asymmetric threat to U.S. ability to operate along China’s coasts.
The Chinese Navy of the Past
Previously China has enjoyed impressive military might but an underdeveloped navy, as historically China needed to preserve its resources to defend against nomadic tribes hailing from the north and west, devaluing the necessity to form a strong navy. The 19th and 20th centuries fall under what has been dubbed the “Century of Humiliation” in China, marred by the memory of a time when the Qing dynasty’s navy was unable to prevent the economic and political imposition of foreign powers. Adding insult to injury was the devastating defeat of the navy by the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5. The embarrassment of a weak navy spurred the People’s Republic of China (PRC), established in 1949, to begin investing in its maritime capabilities, though, “until recently, China lacked the technical and industrial capacity to build a modern navy and lacked sufficient funds to purchase modern systems from abroad.” Its limitations were exacerbated by the 1) Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which caused an enormous setback to scientific development, 2) the Sino- Soviet split, which lost them Soviet technical support, and 3) the country’s devotion of military resources to aircraft and nuclear weapons needed to respond to Soviet threat. That all changed as the Chinese economy began to rise, and the importance of sea lines of communication in terms of trade, as well as the Taiwan issue led the CCP to begin investing heavily in developing a more powerful navy.
Objectives of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Chinese Navy of the Past
During the PLAN’s early days its main purpose was merely “coastal defense” given that the PRC perceived its biggest threats as continental, namely the Soviet Union, or the U.S. presence in Vietnam. In 1982 the focus shifted towards “off shore defense”, referring to operations that fall within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that is any country’s surrounding 200 nautical miles. Then the U.S.’s hefty naval response to the 3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis (in which the PRC conducted missile testing in the Taiwan Strait), and the progression of the Japanese and Taiwanese navies convinced the PRC that it was time to begin developing a navy that could compete with those of other world powers. This led to the most recent strategy of “distant sea defense”, aimed at China’s specific maritime concerns and at bolstering its leading position on the global stage.
What motivates the PLAN’s strive toward modernization and technological advancement are a host of deep-seated ambitions and aims, but they can all be boiled down to the PRC’s 3 basic intentions: 1) the survival of the regime 2) the stability of the country and 3) the territorial integrity of China. In relation to territorial integrity, “The PRC continues to view reunification with Taiwan as an unalterable long-term goal for reasons involving historic claims, national pride, domestic stability, and geostrategic posture,” and the goal of preventing Taiwan’s move for independence was an early motivating factor of Chinese naval development. The U.S.’s past and potential involvement in PRC-Taiwanese affairs remain a major reason why China resents American political and military dominance in the Asia-Pacific.
The PRC also stakes historical claim to much of the South China Sea region. Though it is more likely that Chinese interest in the area relates more to economic motivating factors, which relate to the China’s other strategic concerns: the survival of the regime and domestic stability. Many believe that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) depends on sustaining high levels of economic growth to retain power. China’s economic growth “is dependent upon importing and exporting large amounts of raw materials and finished products,” necessitating the need for control over sea lines of communication (SLOC), for “it is along these strategic routes that the overwhelming majority of China’s foreign trade – over 90 percent by volume and over 80 percent by value – is transported.” Furthermore, the South China Sea holds even more value in that it provides not only fishing resources but also access to numerous deposits of oil and natural gas. This is crucial to China, as “to sustain economic growth, China must rely increasingly upon external sources of energy and raw materials.” China’s claims to the region have already led it into conflicts with many neighboring nations, such as Vietnam and India, further heightening China’s need for a navy capable of securing its interests.
PLAN Strategies and Advancements
One aspect of Chinese naval strategy relates to its policy of “peaceful development” that the PRC began in the mid-1990’s, “to enable economic growth and modernization, while mitigating the risk that other nations might perceive China as a threat.” This combined with China’s desire to exert influence along the Sea-lanes despite lacking the ability to project its power incentivized the development the “String of Pearls”, an approach to developing the PRC’s regional maritime presence. The “pearls” are military and economic posts, such as an airstrip in the Paracel islands off the coast of Vietnam, a container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, or a deep-water port in Sittwe, Myanmar. They stretch from Mainland China, “through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.” Though such widespread Chinese influence may seem threatening to U.S. regional posture, China maintains soft power throughout the “String of Pearls”. Involved nations are more than welcome to engage in favorable relations with both countries, and “with the United States as the unquestionable military superpower, nations are discovering that they do not have to choose sides.”
What does incite American trepidation is the PLAN’s military modernization. The PLA has been developing a variety of new capabilities that are the first steps in closing the gap in naval might of the two countries. China increased its military budget dramatically over the past two decades, and it seems to be paying off as, “all that spending has gone to building a sophisticated, modern military: a large, increasingly capable submarine fleet, an air force stocked with Russian warplanes, and technical strides which have improved China’s ballistic missile arsenal, as well as satellite surveillance, radar, and interception capabilities.” The navy’s main achievements to date include anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), aircraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), maritime surveillance and targeting systems, and anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities.
China’s anti-ship ballistic missile is the first of its kind able to change its course in order to hit moving ships or aircraft carriers, which poses an unnerving risk to the U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific as, “the U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea.” Anti-ship cruise missiles, similarly, are accurately guided missiles designed to carry warheads over immense distances to target ships. The development of aircraft carriers enables employment of an oceanic airbase, allowing for farther projections of the country’s air force, which some estimates predict the PLAN could accomplish as early as 2015. However, due to the fact that Taiwan is well within the reach of China’s land-based air force, and that other aircraft carrier related attack would be highly vulnerable to U.S. countering, experts believe the purpose of such a capability relates more to power status. Surface combatants are ships intended for warfare above the water surface, of which the PLAN has amped up its domestic production. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), “these ships reflect the leadership priority on an advanced anti-air warfare capability for China’s naval forces, which has historically been a weakness of the fleet.” Amphibious ships differ from normal aircraft carriers in that they’re specifically designed to support helicopters, however these are believed to be intended more for ventures such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or anti-piracy operation, rather than pose a threat to the U.S. Navy. According to the DOD, unmanned aerial vehicles, “will expand China’s options for long-range reconnaissance and strike.” And surveillance and targeting systems would better enable PLAN forces to detect U.S. ships and submarines.
Finally, in 2007 China successfully launched a missile that soared into space, destroying one of its own satellites. The PLAN’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities are perhaps the most disconcerting to the U.S. of the Chinese naval developments. The missile indicated that, “if it so chose, China could build a substantial number of these anti-satellite weapons and thus might soon be able to destroy substantial numbers of U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), upon which the U.S. military heavily depends.” Interestingly enough, because the U.S. has a higher developed space capability, it stands to lose more assets should the two countries engage in conflict in the space domain. Concerns for the U.S. include that, “China might be tempted to attack U.S. military satellites as a casualty free way to signal resolve, dissuade Washington from further involvement in a Taiwan conflict, and significantly compromise U.S. military capabilities if such dissuasion failed.”
U.S. Perspective
Though the PLAN’s recent developments are stirring up U.S. anxiety, the fact remains that there still exists a wide gap in the countries’ naval capabilities, and China’s objectives remain mostly peaceful, as, “beyond Taiwan, China’s evolving maritime power suggests that the PLAN is concerned with protecting SLOCs [Sea Lanes of Communication] to keep open the “choke points” relevant to safeguarding trade and ensuring uninterrupted transport of energy resources.” What is most concerning to the U.S. is the idea that the Chinese navy may become powerful enough to contest U.S. naval hegemony in East Asia. For now, and for the next few decades, the U.S. will maintain overwhelming superiority in terms of naval technological advancement and is taking a non-confrontational route by sending implicit messages to the Chinese by way of its dealings in Australia. Their economic interdependence and both countries’ interest in regional stability suggest that neither party is eager to escalate a China-U.S. conflict. The most effective route for the U.S. as of now in interacting with China must be to proceed with caution and work on cementing and cultivating ties with China’s regional neighbors in the efforts of deterrence and the hopes of engaging the PRC in mutually beneficial cooperation.
by Arielle Shorr
In November of 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama announced boldly to the Australian parliament during his visit, “Th e United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay,” to announce the U.S.’s expanded Asia-Pacific military presence. The decision to increase U.S. influence by sending aircrafts and 2,500 Marines has been the U.S.’s response to concerns from several allies, such as Japan and Australia, that China would replace the U.S. as the regional hegemon. President Obama assured his audience that despite economic constraints, defense cuts “will not come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific.”Though the President’s visit and speech were allegedly not meant to antagonize China, they were certainly symbolic of the U.S.attempt to reaffirm its position and a growing anxiety over China’s rising maritime ambition and naval capabilities. While China’s navy is decades away from reaching a status on par with that of the U.S., its development of A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) capabilities, such as anti-ship and anti-satellite missiles, present an asymmetric threat to U.S. ability to operate along China’s coasts.
The Chinese Navy of the Past
Previously China has enjoyed impressive military might but an underdeveloped navy, as historically China needed to preserve its resources to defend against nomadic tribes hailing from the north and west, devaluing the necessity to form a strong navy. The 19th and 20th centuries fall under what has been dubbed the “Century of Humiliation” in China, marred by the memory of a time when the Qing dynasty’s navy was unable to prevent the economic and political imposition of foreign powers. Adding insult to injury was the devastating defeat of the navy by the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5. The embarrassment of a weak navy spurred the People’s Republic of China (PRC), established in 1949, to begin investing in its maritime capabilities, though, “until recently, China lacked the technical and industrial capacity to build a modern navy and lacked sufficient funds to purchase modern systems from abroad.” Its limitations were exacerbated by the 1) Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which caused an enormous setback to scientific development, 2) the Sino- Soviet split, which lost them Soviet technical support, and 3) the country’s devotion of military resources to aircraft and nuclear weapons needed to respond to Soviet threat. That all changed as the Chinese economy began to rise, and the importance of sea lines of communication in terms of trade, as well as the Taiwan issue led the CCP to begin investing heavily in developing a more powerful navy.
Objectives of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Chinese Navy of the Past
During the PLAN’s early days its main purpose was merely “coastal defense” given that the PRC perceived its biggest threats as continental, namely the Soviet Union, or the U.S. presence in Vietnam. In 1982 the focus shifted towards “off shore defense”, referring to operations that fall within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that is any country’s surrounding 200 nautical miles. Then the U.S.’s hefty naval response to the 3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis (in which the PRC conducted missile testing in the Taiwan Strait), and the progression of the Japanese and Taiwanese navies convinced the PRC that it was time to begin developing a navy that could compete with those of other world powers. This led to the most recent strategy of “distant sea defense”, aimed at China’s specific maritime concerns and at bolstering its leading position on the global stage.
What motivates the PLAN’s strive toward modernization and technological advancement are a host of deep-seated ambitions and aims, but they can all be boiled down to the PRC’s 3 basic intentions: 1) the survival of the regime 2) the stability of the country and 3) the territorial integrity of China. In relation to territorial integrity, “The PRC continues to view reunification with Taiwan as an unalterable long-term goal for reasons involving historic claims, national pride, domestic stability, and geostrategic posture,” and the goal of preventing Taiwan’s move for independence was an early motivating factor of Chinese naval development. The U.S.’s past and potential involvement in PRC-Taiwanese affairs remain a major reason why China resents American political and military dominance in the Asia-Pacific.
The PRC also stakes historical claim to much of the South China Sea region. Though it is more likely that Chinese interest in the area relates more to economic motivating factors, which relate to the China’s other strategic concerns: the survival of the regime and domestic stability. Many believe that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) depends on sustaining high levels of economic growth to retain power. China’s economic growth “is dependent upon importing and exporting large amounts of raw materials and finished products,” necessitating the need for control over sea lines of communication (SLOC), for “it is along these strategic routes that the overwhelming majority of China’s foreign trade – over 90 percent by volume and over 80 percent by value – is transported.” Furthermore, the South China Sea holds even more value in that it provides not only fishing resources but also access to numerous deposits of oil and natural gas. This is crucial to China, as “to sustain economic growth, China must rely increasingly upon external sources of energy and raw materials.” China’s claims to the region have already led it into conflicts with many neighboring nations, such as Vietnam and India, further heightening China’s need for a navy capable of securing its interests.
PLAN Strategies and Advancements
One aspect of Chinese naval strategy relates to its policy of “peaceful development” that the PRC began in the mid-1990’s, “to enable economic growth and modernization, while mitigating the risk that other nations might perceive China as a threat.” This combined with China’s desire to exert influence along the Sea-lanes despite lacking the ability to project its power incentivized the development the “String of Pearls”, an approach to developing the PRC’s regional maritime presence. The “pearls” are military and economic posts, such as an airstrip in the Paracel islands off the coast of Vietnam, a container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, or a deep-water port in Sittwe, Myanmar. They stretch from Mainland China, “through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.” Though such widespread Chinese influence may seem threatening to U.S. regional posture, China maintains soft power throughout the “String of Pearls”. Involved nations are more than welcome to engage in favorable relations with both countries, and “with the United States as the unquestionable military superpower, nations are discovering that they do not have to choose sides.”
What does incite American trepidation is the PLAN’s military modernization. The PLA has been developing a variety of new capabilities that are the first steps in closing the gap in naval might of the two countries. China increased its military budget dramatically over the past two decades, and it seems to be paying off as, “all that spending has gone to building a sophisticated, modern military: a large, increasingly capable submarine fleet, an air force stocked with Russian warplanes, and technical strides which have improved China’s ballistic missile arsenal, as well as satellite surveillance, radar, and interception capabilities.” The navy’s main achievements to date include anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), aircraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), maritime surveillance and targeting systems, and anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities.
China’s anti-ship ballistic missile is the first of its kind able to change its course in order to hit moving ships or aircraft carriers, which poses an unnerving risk to the U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific as, “the U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea.” Anti-ship cruise missiles, similarly, are accurately guided missiles designed to carry warheads over immense distances to target ships. The development of aircraft carriers enables employment of an oceanic airbase, allowing for farther projections of the country’s air force, which some estimates predict the PLAN could accomplish as early as 2015. However, due to the fact that Taiwan is well within the reach of China’s land-based air force, and that other aircraft carrier related attack would be highly vulnerable to U.S. countering, experts believe the purpose of such a capability relates more to power status. Surface combatants are ships intended for warfare above the water surface, of which the PLAN has amped up its domestic production. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), “these ships reflect the leadership priority on an advanced anti-air warfare capability for China’s naval forces, which has historically been a weakness of the fleet.” Amphibious ships differ from normal aircraft carriers in that they’re specifically designed to support helicopters, however these are believed to be intended more for ventures such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or anti-piracy operation, rather than pose a threat to the U.S. Navy. According to the DOD, unmanned aerial vehicles, “will expand China’s options for long-range reconnaissance and strike.” And surveillance and targeting systems would better enable PLAN forces to detect U.S. ships and submarines.
Finally, in 2007 China successfully launched a missile that soared into space, destroying one of its own satellites. The PLAN’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities are perhaps the most disconcerting to the U.S. of the Chinese naval developments. The missile indicated that, “if it so chose, China could build a substantial number of these anti-satellite weapons and thus might soon be able to destroy substantial numbers of U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), upon which the U.S. military heavily depends.” Interestingly enough, because the U.S. has a higher developed space capability, it stands to lose more assets should the two countries engage in conflict in the space domain. Concerns for the U.S. include that, “China might be tempted to attack U.S. military satellites as a casualty free way to signal resolve, dissuade Washington from further involvement in a Taiwan conflict, and significantly compromise U.S. military capabilities if such dissuasion failed.”
U.S. Perspective
Though the PLAN’s recent developments are stirring up U.S. anxiety, the fact remains that there still exists a wide gap in the countries’ naval capabilities, and China’s objectives remain mostly peaceful, as, “beyond Taiwan, China’s evolving maritime power suggests that the PLAN is concerned with protecting SLOCs [Sea Lanes of Communication] to keep open the “choke points” relevant to safeguarding trade and ensuring uninterrupted transport of energy resources.” What is most concerning to the U.S. is the idea that the Chinese navy may become powerful enough to contest U.S. naval hegemony in East Asia. For now, and for the next few decades, the U.S. will maintain overwhelming superiority in terms of naval technological advancement and is taking a non-confrontational route by sending implicit messages to the Chinese by way of its dealings in Australia. Their economic interdependence and both countries’ interest in regional stability suggest that neither party is eager to escalate a China-U.S. conflict. The most effective route for the U.S. as of now in interacting with China must be to proceed with caution and work on cementing and cultivating ties with China’s regional neighbors in the efforts of deterrence and the hopes of engaging the PRC in mutually beneficial cooperation.
