China’s Transition of Power: Domestic Struggles for Political Dominance
by Jieming Chu
In February, the heir apparent of China, Vice President Xi Jinping paid a visit to the United States. After this, a high ranking Chinese official, Bo Xilai, was removed from his position as the Chongqing Party Chief due to his connection with a February incident in which a high ranking Chonqing official, Wang Lijun, attempted to defect to the U.S. consulate in Chongqing. These events reflect China’s complicated domestic political atmosphere surrounding the 2012 Chinese leadership transition. In fall, 70% of the top 200 leadership positions in China will be filled with new faces. Undoubtedly, this leadership transition will have a significant impact on China’s domestic and foreign policies of the next decade. A careful analysis of China’s current political struggle can provide valuable insight into the uncertainties it faces during this crucial year.
Xi Jinping, 58, is the youngest son of Xi Zhongxun, one of the original founders of the Communist revolutionary guerillas in China. Considered a princeling (a descendent of a senior party official), Xi completed his ascent to power within an amazingly short amount of time. A careful analysis of his career path can be used to deduce just how much power he inherited from his powerful father. After graduating from Tsinghua University, he first worked as a secretary in the Central Military Commission, which is the central institution that ensures party control over China’s military forces. This fact alone is enough to imply his privileged background. He then proceeded to take up more substantial leadership roles in local counties and provincial municipals. By 1990, only ten years after getting his first post, he assumed the office of the party chief of Fuzhou, which is the provincial capital of Fujian Province. He spent the next ten years in Fujian Province, making his way up the ladder to become the provincial governor in 2000. He then proceeded to take command of Zhejiang Province as its governor in 2002. Fujian and Zhejiang both are coastal provinces and centers of China’s rapid economic development. During Xi’s stay in Zhejiang, he managed to maintain Zhejiang’s economic growth rate at an average rate of 14%. In 2007, he took his final provincial job as the mayor and party chief of Shanghai, an extremely prestigious position as a reward from the central government. In only 27 years, Xi Jinping completed his ascent to the power center of China, the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo (a nine-member decision making body with the highest level of authority). During the 17 years as the governor of various provinces, Xi Jinping kept himself rather clean and quiet and did not tarnish his reputation with scandals. He successfully evaded criticism and prosecution from the Yuanhua corruption scandal that took place during his reign in Fujian. His appointment as the mayor and party chief of Shanghai was seen as a stepping stone for a higher post. In 2007, he was selected as one of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee, ranking above Li Keqiang. Since then he assumed the roles of Vice President and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, securing his path to become the paramount leader of China’s fifth generation leadership. His rise to power, although fast, created problems for him as well.
Xi has to deal with many problems that come together with his smooth and rapid rise to power. First of all, he is not a charismatic leaderwho can claim a lot of political credits. Unlike Bo Xilai of Chongqing and Wang Yang of Guangdong, he did not leave a legacy of his own in the provinces he ruled. Compared with the current President Hu Jintao, Xi did not demonstrate any similar capacity of leadership in times of emergency either. Hu Jintao, while he was still the governor of Tibet in 1989, reportedly rushed to the frontline with a helmet and an automatic weapon to command the bloody crackdown on protesters. The limited recognition of Xi Jinping among people has resulted in a public perception of him as a mediocre politician who has been relying solely on his powerful family background.
With these in mind, Xi Jinping desperately needs opportunities to gratify his legitimacy and to create momentum for his successful coronation in the fall of 2012. His visit to the United States this month as the vice-president of China thus serves this purpose. His predecessor Hu Jintao, prior to assuming the role of China’s president, also visited the United States as the Vice President of China. A successful trip to the United States would not only demonstrate Xi Jinping’s ability to handle China’s foreign relations, but also increase his publicity through American recognition and media coverage. It is in this sense that Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States bears significant domestic political connotations.
Immediately before Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, despite efforts to create a harmonious atmosphere for this visit, however, a high-level Chinese official Wang Lijun, who used to be the right-hand man of former Chongqing party chief and Politburo Standing Committee candidate Bo Xilai, attempted to defect to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. Wang Lijun stayed in the consulate for 24 hours before he was arrested by agents of the Chinese National Security Bureau, the Chinese equivalent of FBI. According to anonymous sources within the U.Sgovernment, the incident resulted in the transfer of a large amount of sensitive information about the high level power struggle taking place within the Chinese Communist Party. Bo Xilai’s Chongqing government originally tried to hide Wang Lijun’s attempted defection by saying that he simply took “a leave of absence” due to stress. The Central Government, however, acknowledged the incident after taking him into custody later. It is widely believed in China that Wang Lijun’s attempted defection and arrest were related to the power struggle within the CCP. During a news conference on March 15th, premier Wen Jiabao criticized the Chongqing municipal government for its poor handling of the Wang Lijun incident. Almost immediately after that rare public criticism, the Central Government declared in another news conference that Bo Xilai has been removed from all of his party positions.
Bo Xilai was a very influential left -wing party official in Chongqing and his faction sustained the most serious blow in this incident. He was the most out-spoken supporter of left -wing political reforms in China and was a very charismatic politician who was famous for leading the large anti-organized crime campaigns in Chongqing. He claimed significant political credit for initiating this campaign and built up the momentum for his ambition to become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. Apart from his anti-crime policies, Bo also revived memories of Mao-era mass movements such as large concerts featuring old songs of the 1950s. After the Wang Lijun incident, his major competitor Wang Yang, a rather liberal right-wing politician of Guangdong Province, initiated his own version of anti-organized crimes campaign in Guangdong. Wang Yang dictated that this new campaign should focus on striking those within the government who provide protection to crime syndicates. This can be interpreted as a move that directly contrasts and targets Bo’s large but superficial campaign. Now the final removal from power of Bo Xilai signifies that Wang Yang has ultimately emerged as the winner.
In the following months leading up to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in the fourth quarter of 2012, the world should keep a close watch on China’s domestic power struggle. For Xi Jinping and his supporters, these months are vital for their ultimate acquisition of power. On the other hand, Xi’s contenders and other competing factions in China still have a chance to secure or to maintain important positions within the CCP. China, caught in the middle of increasing social instability, economic slow-down and intense political struggle, has to be prepared to face a potentially not-so-smooth transition of power
by Jieming Chu
In February, the heir apparent of China, Vice President Xi Jinping paid a visit to the United States. After this, a high ranking Chinese official, Bo Xilai, was removed from his position as the Chongqing Party Chief due to his connection with a February incident in which a high ranking Chonqing official, Wang Lijun, attempted to defect to the U.S. consulate in Chongqing. These events reflect China’s complicated domestic political atmosphere surrounding the 2012 Chinese leadership transition. In fall, 70% of the top 200 leadership positions in China will be filled with new faces. Undoubtedly, this leadership transition will have a significant impact on China’s domestic and foreign policies of the next decade. A careful analysis of China’s current political struggle can provide valuable insight into the uncertainties it faces during this crucial year.
Xi Jinping, 58, is the youngest son of Xi Zhongxun, one of the original founders of the Communist revolutionary guerillas in China. Considered a princeling (a descendent of a senior party official), Xi completed his ascent to power within an amazingly short amount of time. A careful analysis of his career path can be used to deduce just how much power he inherited from his powerful father. After graduating from Tsinghua University, he first worked as a secretary in the Central Military Commission, which is the central institution that ensures party control over China’s military forces. This fact alone is enough to imply his privileged background. He then proceeded to take up more substantial leadership roles in local counties and provincial municipals. By 1990, only ten years after getting his first post, he assumed the office of the party chief of Fuzhou, which is the provincial capital of Fujian Province. He spent the next ten years in Fujian Province, making his way up the ladder to become the provincial governor in 2000. He then proceeded to take command of Zhejiang Province as its governor in 2002. Fujian and Zhejiang both are coastal provinces and centers of China’s rapid economic development. During Xi’s stay in Zhejiang, he managed to maintain Zhejiang’s economic growth rate at an average rate of 14%. In 2007, he took his final provincial job as the mayor and party chief of Shanghai, an extremely prestigious position as a reward from the central government. In only 27 years, Xi Jinping completed his ascent to the power center of China, the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo (a nine-member decision making body with the highest level of authority). During the 17 years as the governor of various provinces, Xi Jinping kept himself rather clean and quiet and did not tarnish his reputation with scandals. He successfully evaded criticism and prosecution from the Yuanhua corruption scandal that took place during his reign in Fujian. His appointment as the mayor and party chief of Shanghai was seen as a stepping stone for a higher post. In 2007, he was selected as one of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee, ranking above Li Keqiang. Since then he assumed the roles of Vice President and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, securing his path to become the paramount leader of China’s fifth generation leadership. His rise to power, although fast, created problems for him as well.
Xi has to deal with many problems that come together with his smooth and rapid rise to power. First of all, he is not a charismatic leaderwho can claim a lot of political credits. Unlike Bo Xilai of Chongqing and Wang Yang of Guangdong, he did not leave a legacy of his own in the provinces he ruled. Compared with the current President Hu Jintao, Xi did not demonstrate any similar capacity of leadership in times of emergency either. Hu Jintao, while he was still the governor of Tibet in 1989, reportedly rushed to the frontline with a helmet and an automatic weapon to command the bloody crackdown on protesters. The limited recognition of Xi Jinping among people has resulted in a public perception of him as a mediocre politician who has been relying solely on his powerful family background.
With these in mind, Xi Jinping desperately needs opportunities to gratify his legitimacy and to create momentum for his successful coronation in the fall of 2012. His visit to the United States this month as the vice-president of China thus serves this purpose. His predecessor Hu Jintao, prior to assuming the role of China’s president, also visited the United States as the Vice President of China. A successful trip to the United States would not only demonstrate Xi Jinping’s ability to handle China’s foreign relations, but also increase his publicity through American recognition and media coverage. It is in this sense that Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States bears significant domestic political connotations.
Immediately before Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, despite efforts to create a harmonious atmosphere for this visit, however, a high-level Chinese official Wang Lijun, who used to be the right-hand man of former Chongqing party chief and Politburo Standing Committee candidate Bo Xilai, attempted to defect to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. Wang Lijun stayed in the consulate for 24 hours before he was arrested by agents of the Chinese National Security Bureau, the Chinese equivalent of FBI. According to anonymous sources within the U.Sgovernment, the incident resulted in the transfer of a large amount of sensitive information about the high level power struggle taking place within the Chinese Communist Party. Bo Xilai’s Chongqing government originally tried to hide Wang Lijun’s attempted defection by saying that he simply took “a leave of absence” due to stress. The Central Government, however, acknowledged the incident after taking him into custody later. It is widely believed in China that Wang Lijun’s attempted defection and arrest were related to the power struggle within the CCP. During a news conference on March 15th, premier Wen Jiabao criticized the Chongqing municipal government for its poor handling of the Wang Lijun incident. Almost immediately after that rare public criticism, the Central Government declared in another news conference that Bo Xilai has been removed from all of his party positions.
Bo Xilai was a very influential left -wing party official in Chongqing and his faction sustained the most serious blow in this incident. He was the most out-spoken supporter of left -wing political reforms in China and was a very charismatic politician who was famous for leading the large anti-organized crime campaigns in Chongqing. He claimed significant political credit for initiating this campaign and built up the momentum for his ambition to become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. Apart from his anti-crime policies, Bo also revived memories of Mao-era mass movements such as large concerts featuring old songs of the 1950s. After the Wang Lijun incident, his major competitor Wang Yang, a rather liberal right-wing politician of Guangdong Province, initiated his own version of anti-organized crimes campaign in Guangdong. Wang Yang dictated that this new campaign should focus on striking those within the government who provide protection to crime syndicates. This can be interpreted as a move that directly contrasts and targets Bo’s large but superficial campaign. Now the final removal from power of Bo Xilai signifies that Wang Yang has ultimately emerged as the winner.
In the following months leading up to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in the fourth quarter of 2012, the world should keep a close watch on China’s domestic power struggle. For Xi Jinping and his supporters, these months are vital for their ultimate acquisition of power. On the other hand, Xi’s contenders and other competing factions in China still have a chance to secure or to maintain important positions within the CCP. China, caught in the middle of increasing social instability, economic slow-down and intense political struggle, has to be prepared to face a potentially not-so-smooth transition of power
