Confrontations Between Tibetan Protesters and the CCP Police Continue
by Arielle Shorr
On February 19th 18-year-old Nangdrol shouted out cries for Tibetan independence before dousing himself in kerosene and setting himself on fire outside of his monastery. His death was the most recent of over 20 incidences of self-immolations since March 2011 on the part of Tibetan monks, nuns, and civilians protesting Chinese rule. All but one of these protests has occurred outside the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the majority taking place in Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces near the border of Tibet. There have also been an increasing number of recent clashes between civil protesters and Chinese police, resulting in the shooting of over 30 people to date. All of these occurrences indicate that the now decades-old conflict between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long been festering since the mass rioting in the ethnic Tibetan area of Lhasa in 2008. The recent increasing violence, however, may suggest that Tibetan people are growing increasingly impatient as they desperately yearn for the return of their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.
The relationship between China and Tibet is a very complex one and also one that has seen many changes throughout the course of history. What further complicates the matter is the fact that the PRC heavily restricts access to information from Tibet. Given the polarity of opinions on both sides, exemplified by the Dalai Lama’s assertion that China is committing cultural genocide against Tibetans and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintaining the stance that the Dalai Lama is a “wolf in monk’s clothing”, it is extremely difficult to piece out anything close to objective truth, so perhaps a bit of background information will prove useful. The relevant narrative begins with the PRC’s military invasion of Tibet in 1949-50. Immediately following the Communist victory over the Kuomentang (KMT), the CCP enacted a policy of “national regional autonomy” that divided regions of minority populations into individualized units that would fall under centralized Chinese rule. Tough each region would undergo a “democratic reform” process, this meant that the PRC would replace most traditional Tibetan leaders with Chinese collaborators.
Many times these “reforms” were followed by revolts, though none as serious as in 1959, when Tibetans launched a massive armed uprising for independence, the failure of which forced the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, to fee the country and form the Tibet Government in Exile (TGIE) in Dharamsala, India. Even though the TAR was officially formed In 1993, talks between China and the Dalai Lama broke down, and in ’99 Beijing declared that Tibet is “an inseparable part of China” and would only allow Tibet’s upmost spiritual leader re-entry if he ceased to demand independence. East Asia East Asia Chinese security forces amp up their presence in the town of Aba following a string of self-immolations by Tibetan monks. in 1965, this too only allowed PRC-approved leadership. The Cultural Revolution that followed a year later brought with it an intense crackdown on Tibetan liberty, as Chinese revolutionary nationalism was stressed above all else, and the CCP asserted pressure on all minority groups to assimilate them.
In the mid-80’s, China began to ease up its authority, passing new laws that granted increased religious and governmental freedoms to autonomous regions. China often holds that this period of liberalization is responsible for the rioting and demonstrating that took place in the later part of the decade, further cementing their viewpoint that a lenient Tibet policy would lead to instability and revolt. Indeed, China’s relative leniency during this time allowed Tibet to grow more aggressive in its demands. From this point on, the TGIE maintained that, “for an accommodation to be reached, China would have to renounce all control over affairs in Tibet except those involving foreign affairs and defense,” though the TGIE and the Dalai Lama have since changed their stance to one of moderation.
In 1993, talks between China and the Dalai Lama broke down, and in ’99 Beijing declared that Tibet is “an inseparable part of China” and would only allow Tibet’s upmost spiritual leader re-entry if he ceased to demand independence. And in the past decade, this is precisely what he’s done. When the USSR collapsed, many thought the CCP might follow suit, and this perhaps explains the Dalai Lama and the TGIE’s initially aggressive pursuit of more political autonomy, such as Tibet’s own constitution and basic law. Possibly due to the fact that the CCP has not dissolved as earlier predicted, the Dalai Lama and his exiled government have gradually softened their stance and their demands since the late 80’s and have placed greater effort into negotiations. Furthermore, the fact that all other countries, even those who support the Tibetan cause, grant that Tibet is a part of China has probably also impacted the TGIE’s position on its China relations.
After demanding that China allow Tibet “to become [a] free and equal partner in a new world order,” the Dalai Lama has since begun to pursue cultural rather than political autonomy. In an even more dramatically different approach, during an interview in 2005 the Dalai Lama expressed that, “he recognized the PRC Tibetans are in some measure Chinese, because Tibetan culture and Buddhism are part of Chinese culture and Tibet is part of China’s 5,000-year history. He also affirmed that Tibet gains materially from being a part of China.”
And yet, little progress has been made and the situation has, in fact, worsened. So what are the current reasons why both sides still do not agree? China has long maintained an ambition to “modernize” the Tibetan nation of mostly farmers and herders along with other areas under PRC control. Unfortunately, many of these modernizing efforts have coincided with secularizing measures intended to draw Tibet away from what the PRC sees largely as a backwards way of life and have met with great agony and resistance by the Tibetan people. “Secular officials have removed religious rulers from power; monasteries have become politically and economically insignificant institutions; and the religious training given by monasteries have been largely replaced by the modern Chinese education system” (which requires the learning of Chinese, not Tibetan). Furthermore, as a means of bringing in income, China has worked to increase tourism in many Tibetan cities, resulting in the transformation from religious sites to commercialized attractions.
Another cause of conflict is China’s ongoing “Patriotic Education” campaigns, intended to promote loyalty and lessen the influence of the Dalai Lama, which are not always optional, especially for monks who have been detained. Even though the government has invested heavily in Tibetan populated areas, it is believed that the benefits have gone mostly toward ethnic Han Chinese, increasing the economic and social disparity between them. Tibetans see this largely as an attempt to Sinify Tibet. Photos of the Dalai Lama are banned from homes and establishments, and furthermore any religious practice that can be seen as separatist is strictly banned. This means no open support of the Dalai Lama, whom the CCP sees as an advocate of separatism. And yet this creates an almost impossible situation for Tibetans, for whom the Dalai Lama is so closely tied to their religion that it would be like allowing Catholics to practice while banning any reference to the Pope.
China has accused the Dalai Lama and what they call his “Dalai Clique” of undermining the CCP, continuing to seek independence, and encouraging and calling for the use of self-immolation as protests. In 2008, the CCP Party Secretary of Tibet called the Dalai Lama, “a vicious devil who is a beast in human form,” and even suspected that his ‘middle way,’ or his compromised stance, is a form of manipulation designed to disguise his true intention to achieve independence.
Furthermore, the CCP may have reason to stall on negotiations as, “some PRC hardliners believe the Dalai Lama’s death will be a grave blow to the Tibetan drive for independence and that migrants will create a multi-ethnic community in Tibetan areas that will weaken the demographic basis for an independence movement.” And if the Dalai Lama dies outside of Tibet, it could lead to religious rifts. The CCP believes that should they allow him to return, it would mean the end of Chinese control in the region. According to China, Tibet is already autonomous and is benefiting from Chinese investment and modernization efforts.
Finally, in 1998 President Jiang Zemin announced that the CCP required that the Dalai Lama, “publicly make a statement and a commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China” and “must also recognize Taiwan as a province of China.” When asked whether or not this is a statement the Dalai Lama is willing to make, he replied, “Not that one sentence,” and insisted that the autonomous region of Tibet only became a part of the PRC after he signed an agreement granting China sovereignty in 1951. He has also stated that Taiwan is, “not my business” and “mainly depends on the people of Taiwan.”
This past March, following the self-immolation of a 20-year-old man named Phuntsog, Chinese security forces overran the monastery where he used to live and detained some 300 monks. The procedure for trying them is unclear because little information is disseminated regarding the treatment of Tibetan prisoners. Tibetans are not allowed to mourn those who have committed suicide in protest, nor are they allowed to come to the aid of those who may still be rescued after they have set themselves on fire. In many cases the police remove the body immediately, which Tibetans fear denies the demonstrator the proper burial process. Clashes between the police and civilians have resulted when police tried to prevent people from approaching the scene of immolation. In other instances they have sealed of monasteries and begun patriotic education campaigns.
The Dalai Lama insists that he does not condone self-immolation. Lobsang Sangay, the elected leader of the TGIE, in an interview explained, “His holiness always preaches that nonviolence and compassion in a peaceful way should be our fundamental philosophy and strategy in dealing with the Chinese government,” explaining why Tibetan protesters have chosen to harm themselves rather than react violently towards the Chinese. Sangay does not believe the death of the Dalai Lama would mean the end of the Tibetan cause, but rather “the Tibetan spirit is the foundation on which we have built our movement – based on 2,500-plus years of Buddhism compared to communism, which is 100-plus years old. We do believe time is on our side.”
It is hard to imagine either side relenting to the other. Will the self-immolations continue? Will the demonstrations provoke foreign intervention? Will any changes occur before the passing of the Dalai Lama and if not, then how will his death affect the situation? These are only some of the many questions evoked by the conflict. Unfortunately, for now it seems the world will have to continue waiting for the answers.
by Arielle Shorr
On February 19th 18-year-old Nangdrol shouted out cries for Tibetan independence before dousing himself in kerosene and setting himself on fire outside of his monastery. His death was the most recent of over 20 incidences of self-immolations since March 2011 on the part of Tibetan monks, nuns, and civilians protesting Chinese rule. All but one of these protests has occurred outside the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the majority taking place in Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces near the border of Tibet. There have also been an increasing number of recent clashes between civil protesters and Chinese police, resulting in the shooting of over 30 people to date. All of these occurrences indicate that the now decades-old conflict between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long been festering since the mass rioting in the ethnic Tibetan area of Lhasa in 2008. The recent increasing violence, however, may suggest that Tibetan people are growing increasingly impatient as they desperately yearn for the return of their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.
The relationship between China and Tibet is a very complex one and also one that has seen many changes throughout the course of history. What further complicates the matter is the fact that the PRC heavily restricts access to information from Tibet. Given the polarity of opinions on both sides, exemplified by the Dalai Lama’s assertion that China is committing cultural genocide against Tibetans and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintaining the stance that the Dalai Lama is a “wolf in monk’s clothing”, it is extremely difficult to piece out anything close to objective truth, so perhaps a bit of background information will prove useful. The relevant narrative begins with the PRC’s military invasion of Tibet in 1949-50. Immediately following the Communist victory over the Kuomentang (KMT), the CCP enacted a policy of “national regional autonomy” that divided regions of minority populations into individualized units that would fall under centralized Chinese rule. Tough each region would undergo a “democratic reform” process, this meant that the PRC would replace most traditional Tibetan leaders with Chinese collaborators.
Many times these “reforms” were followed by revolts, though none as serious as in 1959, when Tibetans launched a massive armed uprising for independence, the failure of which forced the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, to fee the country and form the Tibet Government in Exile (TGIE) in Dharamsala, India. Even though the TAR was officially formed In 1993, talks between China and the Dalai Lama broke down, and in ’99 Beijing declared that Tibet is “an inseparable part of China” and would only allow Tibet’s upmost spiritual leader re-entry if he ceased to demand independence. East Asia East Asia Chinese security forces amp up their presence in the town of Aba following a string of self-immolations by Tibetan monks. in 1965, this too only allowed PRC-approved leadership. The Cultural Revolution that followed a year later brought with it an intense crackdown on Tibetan liberty, as Chinese revolutionary nationalism was stressed above all else, and the CCP asserted pressure on all minority groups to assimilate them.
In the mid-80’s, China began to ease up its authority, passing new laws that granted increased religious and governmental freedoms to autonomous regions. China often holds that this period of liberalization is responsible for the rioting and demonstrating that took place in the later part of the decade, further cementing their viewpoint that a lenient Tibet policy would lead to instability and revolt. Indeed, China’s relative leniency during this time allowed Tibet to grow more aggressive in its demands. From this point on, the TGIE maintained that, “for an accommodation to be reached, China would have to renounce all control over affairs in Tibet except those involving foreign affairs and defense,” though the TGIE and the Dalai Lama have since changed their stance to one of moderation.
In 1993, talks between China and the Dalai Lama broke down, and in ’99 Beijing declared that Tibet is “an inseparable part of China” and would only allow Tibet’s upmost spiritual leader re-entry if he ceased to demand independence. And in the past decade, this is precisely what he’s done. When the USSR collapsed, many thought the CCP might follow suit, and this perhaps explains the Dalai Lama and the TGIE’s initially aggressive pursuit of more political autonomy, such as Tibet’s own constitution and basic law. Possibly due to the fact that the CCP has not dissolved as earlier predicted, the Dalai Lama and his exiled government have gradually softened their stance and their demands since the late 80’s and have placed greater effort into negotiations. Furthermore, the fact that all other countries, even those who support the Tibetan cause, grant that Tibet is a part of China has probably also impacted the TGIE’s position on its China relations.
After demanding that China allow Tibet “to become [a] free and equal partner in a new world order,” the Dalai Lama has since begun to pursue cultural rather than political autonomy. In an even more dramatically different approach, during an interview in 2005 the Dalai Lama expressed that, “he recognized the PRC Tibetans are in some measure Chinese, because Tibetan culture and Buddhism are part of Chinese culture and Tibet is part of China’s 5,000-year history. He also affirmed that Tibet gains materially from being a part of China.”
And yet, little progress has been made and the situation has, in fact, worsened. So what are the current reasons why both sides still do not agree? China has long maintained an ambition to “modernize” the Tibetan nation of mostly farmers and herders along with other areas under PRC control. Unfortunately, many of these modernizing efforts have coincided with secularizing measures intended to draw Tibet away from what the PRC sees largely as a backwards way of life and have met with great agony and resistance by the Tibetan people. “Secular officials have removed religious rulers from power; monasteries have become politically and economically insignificant institutions; and the religious training given by monasteries have been largely replaced by the modern Chinese education system” (which requires the learning of Chinese, not Tibetan). Furthermore, as a means of bringing in income, China has worked to increase tourism in many Tibetan cities, resulting in the transformation from religious sites to commercialized attractions.
Another cause of conflict is China’s ongoing “Patriotic Education” campaigns, intended to promote loyalty and lessen the influence of the Dalai Lama, which are not always optional, especially for monks who have been detained. Even though the government has invested heavily in Tibetan populated areas, it is believed that the benefits have gone mostly toward ethnic Han Chinese, increasing the economic and social disparity between them. Tibetans see this largely as an attempt to Sinify Tibet. Photos of the Dalai Lama are banned from homes and establishments, and furthermore any religious practice that can be seen as separatist is strictly banned. This means no open support of the Dalai Lama, whom the CCP sees as an advocate of separatism. And yet this creates an almost impossible situation for Tibetans, for whom the Dalai Lama is so closely tied to their religion that it would be like allowing Catholics to practice while banning any reference to the Pope.
China has accused the Dalai Lama and what they call his “Dalai Clique” of undermining the CCP, continuing to seek independence, and encouraging and calling for the use of self-immolation as protests. In 2008, the CCP Party Secretary of Tibet called the Dalai Lama, “a vicious devil who is a beast in human form,” and even suspected that his ‘middle way,’ or his compromised stance, is a form of manipulation designed to disguise his true intention to achieve independence.
Furthermore, the CCP may have reason to stall on negotiations as, “some PRC hardliners believe the Dalai Lama’s death will be a grave blow to the Tibetan drive for independence and that migrants will create a multi-ethnic community in Tibetan areas that will weaken the demographic basis for an independence movement.” And if the Dalai Lama dies outside of Tibet, it could lead to religious rifts. The CCP believes that should they allow him to return, it would mean the end of Chinese control in the region. According to China, Tibet is already autonomous and is benefiting from Chinese investment and modernization efforts.
Finally, in 1998 President Jiang Zemin announced that the CCP required that the Dalai Lama, “publicly make a statement and a commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China” and “must also recognize Taiwan as a province of China.” When asked whether or not this is a statement the Dalai Lama is willing to make, he replied, “Not that one sentence,” and insisted that the autonomous region of Tibet only became a part of the PRC after he signed an agreement granting China sovereignty in 1951. He has also stated that Taiwan is, “not my business” and “mainly depends on the people of Taiwan.”
This past March, following the self-immolation of a 20-year-old man named Phuntsog, Chinese security forces overran the monastery where he used to live and detained some 300 monks. The procedure for trying them is unclear because little information is disseminated regarding the treatment of Tibetan prisoners. Tibetans are not allowed to mourn those who have committed suicide in protest, nor are they allowed to come to the aid of those who may still be rescued after they have set themselves on fire. In many cases the police remove the body immediately, which Tibetans fear denies the demonstrator the proper burial process. Clashes between the police and civilians have resulted when police tried to prevent people from approaching the scene of immolation. In other instances they have sealed of monasteries and begun patriotic education campaigns.
The Dalai Lama insists that he does not condone self-immolation. Lobsang Sangay, the elected leader of the TGIE, in an interview explained, “His holiness always preaches that nonviolence and compassion in a peaceful way should be our fundamental philosophy and strategy in dealing with the Chinese government,” explaining why Tibetan protesters have chosen to harm themselves rather than react violently towards the Chinese. Sangay does not believe the death of the Dalai Lama would mean the end of the Tibetan cause, but rather “the Tibetan spirit is the foundation on which we have built our movement – based on 2,500-plus years of Buddhism compared to communism, which is 100-plus years old. We do believe time is on our side.”
It is hard to imagine either side relenting to the other. Will the self-immolations continue? Will the demonstrations provoke foreign intervention? Will any changes occur before the passing of the Dalai Lama and if not, then how will his death affect the situation? These are only some of the many questions evoked by the conflict. Unfortunately, for now it seems the world will have to continue waiting for the answers.
