From Decentralization to Secession: Tuareg Rebels and the Quest for Balance in Mali
by Jesse Koklas
The call for decentralization is one heard often across the African continent. With so many power vacuums created with the severing of colonial ties, power was given to those who could fight for it. From this beginning, many leaders either did not have their peoples’ best interests at heart, or simply could not effectively manage a new nation, causing more issues for the future. It cannot be said that many African leaders have an easy job- most every system still deals with the eff ects of colonialism and constant unrest due to food insecurity, exacerbated by an unforgiving climate. Mali is no exception. The famine of the 1680s was so unbearable, that many sold themselves into slavery as a way to escape death. Nearly a century later, the country was subjected to a twenty-year drought, and so it continues. Although southern Mali is extremely fertile due to the Niger and Senegal Rivers, the northern half of the country is arid, Saharan dessert; 65% of Mali is semi-dessert or dessert. This type of infertile land fosters a nomadic style of life, which suited the Tuareg people of the north quite well.
When speaking of decentralization efforts in Mali, it is important to mention the territorial organization attempts made in the beginning stages of the Republic in the 1960s. These territorial “laws” organized the country into hierarchical units, beginning with regions and ending in tribes. Unfortunately, they greatly resembled the territorial organizations made by the French colonists, and so did not always accurately represent the groups who lived there. Accordingly, they were not paid much heed and decentralization was not achieved. These lines were particularly difficult to apply to nomadic groups, whose boundaries could not be defined, and so in 1990 the northern nomadic Tuaregs began their armed struggle for decentralization, determined to have their voices heard through more localized power.
Decentralization allows local governments to administer development programs in a more efficient manner than central governments. They often have a more personal connection with their people and therefore feel more responsibility towards them and can be held directly accountable for their action or inaction, as the case may be. For Mali, greater decentralization means more diverse representation, and therefore a more accurate representation of their people. However, in some cases decentralization can do more harm than good. Local governments may lack adequate resources to implement eff ective development policy, especially qualified individuals. Often local participation is minimal, and only a small group heads such efforts, which can easily lead to corruption. Even after power is shifted locally, the state can still control resources, and so retain control. Ironically, decentralization works best when the central government is strong, and can maintain authority during and after such reforms. Mali’s government is not one of these.
The history of decentralization in Mali has largely been a story of success, yet it is now more than ever plagued with structural weaknesses. In the beginning stages of the Tuareg-led rebellion, a national conference of major local actors was held, where they outlined their goals of decentralization. The most important of these were free self-management of the municipalities through elected councils, and the creation of a “high council” of the municipalities focused on local development. This high council was meant to function like the second chamber of parliament, meaning it would check the actions of the government, and provide expertise in local development matters. These outlines were soon written into law, and in 1998 the then President Alpha Oumar Konaré organized the set up of municipal elections, and increased the number of municipalities from 19 to 702. The World Bank invested heavily in decentralization efforts from 1993-2004, in order to alleviate poverty through greater privatization. The strides the movement made in only a few years is remarkable, and attests to the will and strength of the people of Mali. Unfortunately, these laws are a great deal easier to write than to finance and effectively implement. Mali’s success with localization of power and multiparty elections has weakened it as a whole in some ways. Its democratic successes make Mali especially attractive to donor countries, and enforce a relationship of dependence on foreign aid. These foreign entities help with the design and implementation of decentralization, in essence undermining local power and local control of development programs. This is especially easy for the foreign companies to do, because lack of funding for education in Mali makes it difficult to locate qualified, literate locals to lead the efforts. Since the World Bank withdrew its aid for decentralization, the fight has lost steam. Government strategy no longer stresses its importance, triggering a chain reaction of loss of enthusiasm from donor organizations as well.
Unlike many other African countries, Malian politics have never focused on ethnic issues despite the great diversity of its population. As a result, decentralization and greater democratization has fueled ethnicity based political divides. The Tuareg unrest of late underscores Mali’s difficulty in maintaining a united nation. However, secession of the Tuaregs is not the solution. Traditionally a nomadic people, they are increasingly forced to settle down as severe droughts have rendered their style of life unproductive. However, attempting to draw this Tuareg state would prove difficult, as their nomadic tendencies have caused them to spread out- they live now primarily in Niger, Mali, Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Libya. The biggest reason secession would fail is because they have no sense of “sameness.” The Tuareg are divided into several main political groups or tribal units. Their distinguishing characteristics include the unity of their language, their alphabet, and their complex social organization. Although for the most part they share the same basic beliefs of Islam, they belong to different sects and have different cultures.
The Timbuktu Tuareg, the Tahoua Tuareg, and the Udalan Tuareg are the main Tuareg groups in Mali, of seven principal Tuareg federations. The largest of these federations, the Ahaggaren primarily of Algeria, was declared terminated by the Algerian government in 1977. The Tuaregs of Mali have accepted resistance from the government, though, and have fought for their rights at every turn. 1991 estimates place the Tuareg population of Mali at 440,000. Now, the population of Mali is over 15 million, so the Tuareg people only account for a small percentage. The Tuaregs of Mali and Niger have had similar histories of resistance, primarily because of the tight restrictions the governments put on nomad groups. These, coupled with growing desertifi cation, caused clashes with government forces, as the Tuaregs of Mali and Niger, respectively, sought to regain their traditional homeland areas. They each signed peace agreements with their government, Mali in 1995 and Niger in 1996. In 2004 sporadic uprisings in Niger began, and recently Tuareg groups in Mali have offered resistance, displacing many people into neighboring countries as a result. It seems as if those Tuareg tribes that sacrifice some or all of their nomadic lifestyle for a more sedentary, agricultural one, are the tribes that are politically content. However, this integration comes at the price of the loss of their traditional lifestyle that, for now, defines their culture and their people.
Secession of the northern Tuaregs in Mali would be ill conceived. It is unclear which Tuaregs are calling for this and what type of system they would put into place if they were to succeed. There are others to be considered, though, The Tuaregs are not the only inhabitants of the land, and we do not know that the other people there have any desire to be disconnected from their country. If the Tuaregs’ rights are not being respected, it is understandable that they should be upset.
However, at least some of the Tuareg groups seem to be able to organize themselves well, and so should be able to fight for stronger local government to make their voices heard, and even get a few members into government positions. If they lent their passion and their educated, willing individuals to work to improve development, their districts could make real change, while simultaneously giving them power and representation. Separating themselves completely would leave them with no political or economic structure, and much less support than before. Until the Mali government makes strengthening itself a priority, local governments must create development education programs to train their people to pick up the slack that the central government is creating.
by Jesse Koklas
The call for decentralization is one heard often across the African continent. With so many power vacuums created with the severing of colonial ties, power was given to those who could fight for it. From this beginning, many leaders either did not have their peoples’ best interests at heart, or simply could not effectively manage a new nation, causing more issues for the future. It cannot be said that many African leaders have an easy job- most every system still deals with the eff ects of colonialism and constant unrest due to food insecurity, exacerbated by an unforgiving climate. Mali is no exception. The famine of the 1680s was so unbearable, that many sold themselves into slavery as a way to escape death. Nearly a century later, the country was subjected to a twenty-year drought, and so it continues. Although southern Mali is extremely fertile due to the Niger and Senegal Rivers, the northern half of the country is arid, Saharan dessert; 65% of Mali is semi-dessert or dessert. This type of infertile land fosters a nomadic style of life, which suited the Tuareg people of the north quite well.
When speaking of decentralization efforts in Mali, it is important to mention the territorial organization attempts made in the beginning stages of the Republic in the 1960s. These territorial “laws” organized the country into hierarchical units, beginning with regions and ending in tribes. Unfortunately, they greatly resembled the territorial organizations made by the French colonists, and so did not always accurately represent the groups who lived there. Accordingly, they were not paid much heed and decentralization was not achieved. These lines were particularly difficult to apply to nomadic groups, whose boundaries could not be defined, and so in 1990 the northern nomadic Tuaregs began their armed struggle for decentralization, determined to have their voices heard through more localized power.
Decentralization allows local governments to administer development programs in a more efficient manner than central governments. They often have a more personal connection with their people and therefore feel more responsibility towards them and can be held directly accountable for their action or inaction, as the case may be. For Mali, greater decentralization means more diverse representation, and therefore a more accurate representation of their people. However, in some cases decentralization can do more harm than good. Local governments may lack adequate resources to implement eff ective development policy, especially qualified individuals. Often local participation is minimal, and only a small group heads such efforts, which can easily lead to corruption. Even after power is shifted locally, the state can still control resources, and so retain control. Ironically, decentralization works best when the central government is strong, and can maintain authority during and after such reforms. Mali’s government is not one of these.
The history of decentralization in Mali has largely been a story of success, yet it is now more than ever plagued with structural weaknesses. In the beginning stages of the Tuareg-led rebellion, a national conference of major local actors was held, where they outlined their goals of decentralization. The most important of these were free self-management of the municipalities through elected councils, and the creation of a “high council” of the municipalities focused on local development. This high council was meant to function like the second chamber of parliament, meaning it would check the actions of the government, and provide expertise in local development matters. These outlines were soon written into law, and in 1998 the then President Alpha Oumar Konaré organized the set up of municipal elections, and increased the number of municipalities from 19 to 702. The World Bank invested heavily in decentralization efforts from 1993-2004, in order to alleviate poverty through greater privatization. The strides the movement made in only a few years is remarkable, and attests to the will and strength of the people of Mali. Unfortunately, these laws are a great deal easier to write than to finance and effectively implement. Mali’s success with localization of power and multiparty elections has weakened it as a whole in some ways. Its democratic successes make Mali especially attractive to donor countries, and enforce a relationship of dependence on foreign aid. These foreign entities help with the design and implementation of decentralization, in essence undermining local power and local control of development programs. This is especially easy for the foreign companies to do, because lack of funding for education in Mali makes it difficult to locate qualified, literate locals to lead the efforts. Since the World Bank withdrew its aid for decentralization, the fight has lost steam. Government strategy no longer stresses its importance, triggering a chain reaction of loss of enthusiasm from donor organizations as well.
Unlike many other African countries, Malian politics have never focused on ethnic issues despite the great diversity of its population. As a result, decentralization and greater democratization has fueled ethnicity based political divides. The Tuareg unrest of late underscores Mali’s difficulty in maintaining a united nation. However, secession of the Tuaregs is not the solution. Traditionally a nomadic people, they are increasingly forced to settle down as severe droughts have rendered their style of life unproductive. However, attempting to draw this Tuareg state would prove difficult, as their nomadic tendencies have caused them to spread out- they live now primarily in Niger, Mali, Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Libya. The biggest reason secession would fail is because they have no sense of “sameness.” The Tuareg are divided into several main political groups or tribal units. Their distinguishing characteristics include the unity of their language, their alphabet, and their complex social organization. Although for the most part they share the same basic beliefs of Islam, they belong to different sects and have different cultures.
The Timbuktu Tuareg, the Tahoua Tuareg, and the Udalan Tuareg are the main Tuareg groups in Mali, of seven principal Tuareg federations. The largest of these federations, the Ahaggaren primarily of Algeria, was declared terminated by the Algerian government in 1977. The Tuaregs of Mali have accepted resistance from the government, though, and have fought for their rights at every turn. 1991 estimates place the Tuareg population of Mali at 440,000. Now, the population of Mali is over 15 million, so the Tuareg people only account for a small percentage. The Tuaregs of Mali and Niger have had similar histories of resistance, primarily because of the tight restrictions the governments put on nomad groups. These, coupled with growing desertifi cation, caused clashes with government forces, as the Tuaregs of Mali and Niger, respectively, sought to regain their traditional homeland areas. They each signed peace agreements with their government, Mali in 1995 and Niger in 1996. In 2004 sporadic uprisings in Niger began, and recently Tuareg groups in Mali have offered resistance, displacing many people into neighboring countries as a result. It seems as if those Tuareg tribes that sacrifice some or all of their nomadic lifestyle for a more sedentary, agricultural one, are the tribes that are politically content. However, this integration comes at the price of the loss of their traditional lifestyle that, for now, defines their culture and their people.
Secession of the northern Tuaregs in Mali would be ill conceived. It is unclear which Tuaregs are calling for this and what type of system they would put into place if they were to succeed. There are others to be considered, though, The Tuaregs are not the only inhabitants of the land, and we do not know that the other people there have any desire to be disconnected from their country. If the Tuaregs’ rights are not being respected, it is understandable that they should be upset.
However, at least some of the Tuareg groups seem to be able to organize themselves well, and so should be able to fight for stronger local government to make their voices heard, and even get a few members into government positions. If they lent their passion and their educated, willing individuals to work to improve development, their districts could make real change, while simultaneously giving them power and representation. Separating themselves completely would leave them with no political or economic structure, and much less support than before. Until the Mali government makes strengthening itself a priority, local governments must create development education programs to train their people to pick up the slack that the central government is creating.
