Interview with Professor Robert J. Art
Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations
By Jieming Chu
JC: China has been speeding up its naval build-up in the recent years, most specifically in the anti access, area denial capabilities of its navy. What do you think are China’s intentions?
Prof. Art: First of all, China wants to push the U.S. Navy and airpower as far from the Chinese coast as possible so that the U.S. cannot operate close to China or attack China. Second, the further out the Chinese can push the U.S. away from the Mainland, the more difficult it is in terms of America’s defense of Taiwan. So here are the two clear defensive reasons from China’s standpoint. The problem is we do not know how much of this capability is offense-oriented. Every country wants to defend its borders. Last but not least, I think China wants to establish predominance in the South China Sea.
JC: What do you make of China’s maritime capabilities (anti-ship, anti-satellite, submarine)? How effective are they, and what are their limits?
Prof. Art: The greatest threats to aircraft carriers are the diesel submarines and the anti-ship missiles. The diesel submarines are pretty effective and they are a real concern of the U.S. Navy. China does not really have an effective anti-ship missile yet. There is a big reconnaissance problem for China. They are still testing their long range reconnaissance platforms. Meanwhile, the United States is working on all kinds of countermeasures to counter their A2/AD. Therefore this is a qualitative arms race between the U.S. and China. It is hard to assess the effectiveness of the A2/AD strategy before you have a war. I think the U.S. will ultimately prevail, but we would take some significant losses.
JC: How do Japan and South Korea and their military capabilities play into the U.S. strategy in Pacific Asia? In the future?
Prof. Art: The U.S has been asking the Japanese to spend more on defense and do more. In the 1990s the U.S. successfully got the Japanese to pledge more assistance. If you look at the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty of 1960, the U.S is obligated to come to the aid of Japan and not vice versa. What the U.S. has been doing is to get Japanese support for America’s operation in Asia in general, not just in the defense of Japan. Japanese are developing some offensive capability. They have small VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) carriers and air-refueling capability now. And they have significant Coast Guard, which is indeed a highly advanced navy. So the U.S. has pushed Japan more in the last 15 to 20 years, and Japan in general have responded. Japan is also said to have yielded to U.S. pressure in the last two or three years to promise some sort of support to the U.S. in case of a Taiwan crisis. The real issue is whether Japan develops nuclear weapons or not. That is a question of credibility of America’s extended nuclear protection. There is nothing in the Japanese constitution that prevents it from acquiring nuclear weapons. The U.S. does not expect South Korean military to do anything else than to repel a North Korean attack at the moment.
JC: The Obama administration has channeled more of U.S. military assets to East Asia. What’s the rationale behind this shift of strategic focus?
Prof. Art: Our allies in the region felt that we were not sufficiently responding to the buildup of Chinese military power in East Asia. But this was because Iraq and Afghanistan were diverting our resources. In fact, we have been shifting assets to Asia in the last four or five years. So this new defense concentration announcement is basically a reiteration of what we have been doing. I think the U.S. has about 60% of its attack submarines in the Pacific, and it is still sending airpower to Guam. This is an attempt to do two things. It is to assure our allies that we are in the region and we have staying power, and to show the Chinese that we intend to maintain our maritime supremacy in East Asia and we will take the steps necessary to balance their increasing military capability.Palestinians should be able to seek international recognition of their status as a state even during negotiations. This allows Abbas to appease his constituency even as he comes under criticism for entering futile negotiations. But as importantly, such a step allows him to enter a bargaining process with the current right wing Israeli government: cessation of settlement construction in return for cessation of UN efforts.
JC: In your opinion, does China have the capacity to contest the United States as a candidate for global supremacy?
Prof. Art: China has been weak militarily since the beginning of the 17th century. Due to its economic growth in the last 30 years, it is able to afford a military development. So you can argue that China is regaining its “rightful” place in East Asia. Can China contest the U.S’s global supremacy? Certainly not now. But down the road in a couple of decades, if the U.S. and China continue their current road path, China’s overall GDP will surpass the U.S.’s at around 2030. Its per capita GDP will be one quarter as rich as the U.S. China is already an economic global power. You can look at its impact on world finance, on trade, and on monetary policy. It already has a global presence economically. But it is still a regional power militarily. So for China to contest the U.S., China needs better regional and global military capabilities. We are not sure whether China is determined to contest the U.S. as a superpower. China currently has some specific concerns like protecting its sea lines of communications. It does not want to depend on the U.S. for the security of its energy supplies because this gives the U.S. leverage over China. It is difficult to make a prediction in at least twenty years.
Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations
By Jieming Chu
JC: China has been speeding up its naval build-up in the recent years, most specifically in the anti access, area denial capabilities of its navy. What do you think are China’s intentions?
Prof. Art: First of all, China wants to push the U.S. Navy and airpower as far from the Chinese coast as possible so that the U.S. cannot operate close to China or attack China. Second, the further out the Chinese can push the U.S. away from the Mainland, the more difficult it is in terms of America’s defense of Taiwan. So here are the two clear defensive reasons from China’s standpoint. The problem is we do not know how much of this capability is offense-oriented. Every country wants to defend its borders. Last but not least, I think China wants to establish predominance in the South China Sea.
JC: What do you make of China’s maritime capabilities (anti-ship, anti-satellite, submarine)? How effective are they, and what are their limits?
Prof. Art: The greatest threats to aircraft carriers are the diesel submarines and the anti-ship missiles. The diesel submarines are pretty effective and they are a real concern of the U.S. Navy. China does not really have an effective anti-ship missile yet. There is a big reconnaissance problem for China. They are still testing their long range reconnaissance platforms. Meanwhile, the United States is working on all kinds of countermeasures to counter their A2/AD. Therefore this is a qualitative arms race between the U.S. and China. It is hard to assess the effectiveness of the A2/AD strategy before you have a war. I think the U.S. will ultimately prevail, but we would take some significant losses.
JC: How do Japan and South Korea and their military capabilities play into the U.S. strategy in Pacific Asia? In the future?
Prof. Art: The U.S has been asking the Japanese to spend more on defense and do more. In the 1990s the U.S. successfully got the Japanese to pledge more assistance. If you look at the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty of 1960, the U.S is obligated to come to the aid of Japan and not vice versa. What the U.S. has been doing is to get Japanese support for America’s operation in Asia in general, not just in the defense of Japan. Japanese are developing some offensive capability. They have small VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) carriers and air-refueling capability now. And they have significant Coast Guard, which is indeed a highly advanced navy. So the U.S. has pushed Japan more in the last 15 to 20 years, and Japan in general have responded. Japan is also said to have yielded to U.S. pressure in the last two or three years to promise some sort of support to the U.S. in case of a Taiwan crisis. The real issue is whether Japan develops nuclear weapons or not. That is a question of credibility of America’s extended nuclear protection. There is nothing in the Japanese constitution that prevents it from acquiring nuclear weapons. The U.S. does not expect South Korean military to do anything else than to repel a North Korean attack at the moment.
JC: The Obama administration has channeled more of U.S. military assets to East Asia. What’s the rationale behind this shift of strategic focus?
Prof. Art: Our allies in the region felt that we were not sufficiently responding to the buildup of Chinese military power in East Asia. But this was because Iraq and Afghanistan were diverting our resources. In fact, we have been shifting assets to Asia in the last four or five years. So this new defense concentration announcement is basically a reiteration of what we have been doing. I think the U.S. has about 60% of its attack submarines in the Pacific, and it is still sending airpower to Guam. This is an attempt to do two things. It is to assure our allies that we are in the region and we have staying power, and to show the Chinese that we intend to maintain our maritime supremacy in East Asia and we will take the steps necessary to balance their increasing military capability.Palestinians should be able to seek international recognition of their status as a state even during negotiations. This allows Abbas to appease his constituency even as he comes under criticism for entering futile negotiations. But as importantly, such a step allows him to enter a bargaining process with the current right wing Israeli government: cessation of settlement construction in return for cessation of UN efforts.
JC: In your opinion, does China have the capacity to contest the United States as a candidate for global supremacy?
Prof. Art: China has been weak militarily since the beginning of the 17th century. Due to its economic growth in the last 30 years, it is able to afford a military development. So you can argue that China is regaining its “rightful” place in East Asia. Can China contest the U.S’s global supremacy? Certainly not now. But down the road in a couple of decades, if the U.S. and China continue their current road path, China’s overall GDP will surpass the U.S.’s at around 2030. Its per capita GDP will be one quarter as rich as the U.S. China is already an economic global power. You can look at its impact on world finance, on trade, and on monetary policy. It already has a global presence economically. But it is still a regional power militarily. So for China to contest the U.S., China needs better regional and global military capabilities. We are not sure whether China is determined to contest the U.S. as a superpower. China currently has some specific concerns like protecting its sea lines of communications. It does not want to depend on the U.S. for the security of its energy supplies because this gives the U.S. leverage over China. It is difficult to make a prediction in at least twenty years.
