Lebanon to join the Arab Spring?
An Interview with a Senior United Nations Official
by Sarah Geller
Lebanon is a fascinating country. Its past is marked by periods of imperialism, violence, and vulnerability. Yet, currently, as the world witnesses uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and most recently, Syria, Lebanon remains one of the quietest countries in the region. Some people may be skeptical about Lebanon’s relatively domestic stability. Nonetheless, its current stability is uncharacteristic and requires further discussion. To facilitate an understanding of Lebanese political structures and society, I conducted an interview with a UN Senior Official in Lebanon. Due to the sensitivity of the topic and the person’s position, the name of the interviewee will remain anonymous.
Sarah: What does a national revolution mean to you?
A revolution is a fairly rapid change in a political system; it does not just constitute a regime change or leader change, but a change in the overall system. Sometimes the system and the leader are the same entity. National refers to people coming together. Additionally, nationality and citizenship are not always the same. For example, in Russia, on a Russian’s passport it indicates both a person’s nationality and citizenship as being two different identifications. While, this official distinction does not exist in Lebanon, the idea of differentiating between nationality and citizenship exists. Lebanon’s political system is based on sectarianism. Sectarianism refers to various groups in Lebanon with different ideologies. The three most common religious sects in Lebanon include Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shi’a Muslims. It is also important to note that cleavages exist among each sect. For example, they exist among Maronite Christians.
A national revolution, like ones experienced in Latin American in the 1980s, can be characterized by a history of a thousand different views but a uniform view on the direction of the country after the revolution. This differs in Egypt where uncertainty exists where the country is going. Certainly, these Latin America examples do not apply to Lebanon where one hundred different narratives exists about its past and hundred more narratives exist about its future.
It is interesting to note that sectarianism is not always visible in the public sphere. As the political sector of Lebanon is relatively calm, one does not really observe the friction among the various sects. People more acknowledge the various sects in a commenting fashion, or in a joking way. Many Lebanese seem disillusioned by their government’s efficiency so that frustration translates into a bonding mechanism. They commiserate over sectarian lines. The Lebanese believe loathing the regime and its actions is different than overthrowing it. A proxy of identifying when the tension among the sects is high or low is if the army is apparent on the streets. As of right now, the army is not regularly monitoring society. Of course, these positive times can reverse themselves quickly; yet, it is has not happened recently.
Sarah: Why has there not been a revolution in Lebanon? Is the relationship between the government and people apathetic, benevolent, etc?
Traditionally, Lebanon has been a vulnerable nation as it is characterized by a sectarian system. These divides have usually led to domestic conflict as identified by the Civil War from 1975-1990, political assassinations beginning in 2005, and clashes between the March 8 and the March 14. Fundamentally, a national revolution can not occur because Lebanese citizens first identify with their sect, or their clan, second they identify as Lebanese. Their nationality and citizenship are too distinct, and thus a national revolution is irrelevant in Lebanon.
Furthermore, the sectarian divides do not just exist in an informal, cultural sphere but are codified in legal, political divisions. According to the 1943 National Pact and the Taif Agreements, which ended the Civil War in 1989, the political framework of confessionalism exists so that the highest offices are proportionately reserved for representatives in certain religious communities. Thus, the president of Lebanon must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament must be a Shi’a Muslim. This enduring political structure prevents Lebanon from having a dictator or an authority to overthrow. One of Lebanon’s strengths is that is does not have an address in which people can overthrow the power structure, and therefore, no national revolution could occur in Lebanon.
While Lebanese citizens, especially some of the youth, have expressed anti-sectarian sentiments, their discontent demonstrated through marches and protests will not change the system. The status quo includes too many vested interests in which people feel they will lose their power if the political structure would ever change.
Sarah: Is Lebanon’s population affected by its Civil War and War in 2006 so that the Lebanese are nervous about the potential of more violence? Why is Lebanon relatively politically stable in its current state?
Lebanese people are still very much scarred by the memories of war. Their memories of violence are not just related to the Civil War, but include Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination in 2005 and then subsequent assassinations, the 2006 War with Israel, the 2007 Lebanon Crisis, and the 2008 March 8 versus March 14 demonstrations. Even just a year ago, the government collapsed. People were scarred that the tire burning in the streets would quickly develop into mass violence. Once Lebanese people experience how quickly one incident can evolve into political chaos, their reaction to any unrest as being frightened is very reasonable. A proxy indicator of the tension levels among the various sects is understood through the price of AK47s on the Black Market. In good times, such as the present, an AK47 will cost about $500, yet during bad times, or during more contentious times, an AK47 will retail for about $1500. The Lebanese are fairly well armed at home, and they understand how quickly good political conditions can deteriorate. Even with economic prosperity and relative political stability, people are ready to resume their loyalty to their respective sect.
The domestic powers have stability as a goal, and they are working very hard to safeguard Lebanon from regional events. It is rather remarkable that nothing in terms of mass violence has happened in Lebanon, especially with the unrest in Syria. Government officials are impressively maintaining low confrontations in Lebanon; of course incidents of violence have occurred in areas such as in Tripoli, but no mass flare up as a result of Syria’s revolutions has happened on the streets of Beirut. The unfortunate results of failed diplomatic talks between the West and China, Russia, and Iran, has allowed for relative political stability in Lebanon.
While the Lebanese government is dysfunctional in terms of standard civil service functions and an extreme dichotomy exists between the successful private sector and the failed public sector, government officials have been very effective in maintaining the stability in Lebanon on two fronts in regards to Syria, while other foreign diplomats have not. First, Lebanese leaders are negotiating with other leaders behind the scene; this is where the influence of the March 8 leaders such as the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament are essential. In an informal sense, serious efforts are being made for dialogue between the Syrian parties. Second, in a formal sense, the Lebanese army plays a positive role. The Lebanese people trust the army – not police – in dealing with the violent spillover effects from Syria. The people view the army as neutral, and even in times when the army cannot remain neutral, it resists in engaging with people. The Lebanese people bestow their trust in the army as they see the army handling the delicate situation of armed refugees crossing the Syrian- Lebanese border.
Sarah: How does Hezbollah’ influence and social service network affect Lebanese people?
Some Lebanese people argue that Lebanon initiated the Arab Uprisings with their ousting of Syria in 2005. While this is not a national revolution like in Egypt, the Lebanese take pride in their pressure to force the Syrians out of Lebanon. Additionally, in recent years, Hezbollah has gained legitimacy in the public sector as they have won parliamentary elections. In a similar fashion, the Egyptian revolution did not begin as a religious revolution, yet the group who benefited the most from the downfall of Mubarak is the religious party, the Muslim Brotherhood.
In Lebanon, aside from any discussion about a national revolution, Hezbollah’s popularity is two-fold. First, they have an extensive social service network that functions the way the Lebanese government should function. After the Lebanese Civil War, the Lebanese government failed to provide social services and perform basic tasks such as collecting taxes and ensuring continuous electricity. Second, Hezbollah captures the support of the Lebanese people, ranging from Shi’a Muslims to Christians, because this small, non-governmental group is seen as the David fighting the Goliath, Israel. Even with military defeats, Hezbollah has the legitimacy and precedent that it can reconstruct and rehabilitate Lebanese society after war. It is necessary to understand the human psychology undermining the Lebanese support for them. The Lebanese people are deprived of dignity from their government that they crave a symbolic entity to confront Israel. Hezbollah has a creditable track record. Its momentum of a legitimate force in Lebanon was solidified after the 2006 war with Israel. Not to condone Hezbollah’s violence, but the rockets from Hezbollah into Israel were not uncommon. Therefore, when Israel attacked Lebanon, the Lebanese were surprised by Israel’s response and look towards Hezbollah to respond and protect them. Additionally, the Lebanese people have witnessed restraint on the part of Hezbollah. Several instances have occurred between Israel and Lebanon/Hezbollah that could have escalated into war, yet Hezbollah did not respond violently. One example includes the Palestinian march to the Israeli border for “al-Naqba” Day. According to Lebanese officials, Israel fired upon the unarmed, Palestinians demonstrators. Hezbollah’s lack of reaction indicates that they do not have interests in regular violence and overall, in the context of violence in Lebanon, it has remained cool-headed.
This cool-headedness certainly applies to the concern about Israeli-Iranian relations. While it is hard to predict what will happen in Lebanon, it is believed that events will not escalate in a violent manner in the immediate future. Rather, the rhetoric is more posturing and beating of the war drums than actually parties considering war. The momentum of the UNSC P5+1 seems to be accelerating so that negotiations, not war, and not violence in Lebanon will remain the present situation.
An Interview with a Senior United Nations Official
by Sarah Geller
Lebanon is a fascinating country. Its past is marked by periods of imperialism, violence, and vulnerability. Yet, currently, as the world witnesses uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and most recently, Syria, Lebanon remains one of the quietest countries in the region. Some people may be skeptical about Lebanon’s relatively domestic stability. Nonetheless, its current stability is uncharacteristic and requires further discussion. To facilitate an understanding of Lebanese political structures and society, I conducted an interview with a UN Senior Official in Lebanon. Due to the sensitivity of the topic and the person’s position, the name of the interviewee will remain anonymous.
Sarah: What does a national revolution mean to you?
A revolution is a fairly rapid change in a political system; it does not just constitute a regime change or leader change, but a change in the overall system. Sometimes the system and the leader are the same entity. National refers to people coming together. Additionally, nationality and citizenship are not always the same. For example, in Russia, on a Russian’s passport it indicates both a person’s nationality and citizenship as being two different identifications. While, this official distinction does not exist in Lebanon, the idea of differentiating between nationality and citizenship exists. Lebanon’s political system is based on sectarianism. Sectarianism refers to various groups in Lebanon with different ideologies. The three most common religious sects in Lebanon include Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shi’a Muslims. It is also important to note that cleavages exist among each sect. For example, they exist among Maronite Christians.
A national revolution, like ones experienced in Latin American in the 1980s, can be characterized by a history of a thousand different views but a uniform view on the direction of the country after the revolution. This differs in Egypt where uncertainty exists where the country is going. Certainly, these Latin America examples do not apply to Lebanon where one hundred different narratives exists about its past and hundred more narratives exist about its future.
It is interesting to note that sectarianism is not always visible in the public sphere. As the political sector of Lebanon is relatively calm, one does not really observe the friction among the various sects. People more acknowledge the various sects in a commenting fashion, or in a joking way. Many Lebanese seem disillusioned by their government’s efficiency so that frustration translates into a bonding mechanism. They commiserate over sectarian lines. The Lebanese believe loathing the regime and its actions is different than overthrowing it. A proxy of identifying when the tension among the sects is high or low is if the army is apparent on the streets. As of right now, the army is not regularly monitoring society. Of course, these positive times can reverse themselves quickly; yet, it is has not happened recently.
Sarah: Why has there not been a revolution in Lebanon? Is the relationship between the government and people apathetic, benevolent, etc?
Traditionally, Lebanon has been a vulnerable nation as it is characterized by a sectarian system. These divides have usually led to domestic conflict as identified by the Civil War from 1975-1990, political assassinations beginning in 2005, and clashes between the March 8 and the March 14. Fundamentally, a national revolution can not occur because Lebanese citizens first identify with their sect, or their clan, second they identify as Lebanese. Their nationality and citizenship are too distinct, and thus a national revolution is irrelevant in Lebanon.
Furthermore, the sectarian divides do not just exist in an informal, cultural sphere but are codified in legal, political divisions. According to the 1943 National Pact and the Taif Agreements, which ended the Civil War in 1989, the political framework of confessionalism exists so that the highest offices are proportionately reserved for representatives in certain religious communities. Thus, the president of Lebanon must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament must be a Shi’a Muslim. This enduring political structure prevents Lebanon from having a dictator or an authority to overthrow. One of Lebanon’s strengths is that is does not have an address in which people can overthrow the power structure, and therefore, no national revolution could occur in Lebanon.
While Lebanese citizens, especially some of the youth, have expressed anti-sectarian sentiments, their discontent demonstrated through marches and protests will not change the system. The status quo includes too many vested interests in which people feel they will lose their power if the political structure would ever change.
Sarah: Is Lebanon’s population affected by its Civil War and War in 2006 so that the Lebanese are nervous about the potential of more violence? Why is Lebanon relatively politically stable in its current state?
Lebanese people are still very much scarred by the memories of war. Their memories of violence are not just related to the Civil War, but include Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination in 2005 and then subsequent assassinations, the 2006 War with Israel, the 2007 Lebanon Crisis, and the 2008 March 8 versus March 14 demonstrations. Even just a year ago, the government collapsed. People were scarred that the tire burning in the streets would quickly develop into mass violence. Once Lebanese people experience how quickly one incident can evolve into political chaos, their reaction to any unrest as being frightened is very reasonable. A proxy indicator of the tension levels among the various sects is understood through the price of AK47s on the Black Market. In good times, such as the present, an AK47 will cost about $500, yet during bad times, or during more contentious times, an AK47 will retail for about $1500. The Lebanese are fairly well armed at home, and they understand how quickly good political conditions can deteriorate. Even with economic prosperity and relative political stability, people are ready to resume their loyalty to their respective sect.
The domestic powers have stability as a goal, and they are working very hard to safeguard Lebanon from regional events. It is rather remarkable that nothing in terms of mass violence has happened in Lebanon, especially with the unrest in Syria. Government officials are impressively maintaining low confrontations in Lebanon; of course incidents of violence have occurred in areas such as in Tripoli, but no mass flare up as a result of Syria’s revolutions has happened on the streets of Beirut. The unfortunate results of failed diplomatic talks between the West and China, Russia, and Iran, has allowed for relative political stability in Lebanon.
While the Lebanese government is dysfunctional in terms of standard civil service functions and an extreme dichotomy exists between the successful private sector and the failed public sector, government officials have been very effective in maintaining the stability in Lebanon on two fronts in regards to Syria, while other foreign diplomats have not. First, Lebanese leaders are negotiating with other leaders behind the scene; this is where the influence of the March 8 leaders such as the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament are essential. In an informal sense, serious efforts are being made for dialogue between the Syrian parties. Second, in a formal sense, the Lebanese army plays a positive role. The Lebanese people trust the army – not police – in dealing with the violent spillover effects from Syria. The people view the army as neutral, and even in times when the army cannot remain neutral, it resists in engaging with people. The Lebanese people bestow their trust in the army as they see the army handling the delicate situation of armed refugees crossing the Syrian- Lebanese border.
Sarah: How does Hezbollah’ influence and social service network affect Lebanese people?
Some Lebanese people argue that Lebanon initiated the Arab Uprisings with their ousting of Syria in 2005. While this is not a national revolution like in Egypt, the Lebanese take pride in their pressure to force the Syrians out of Lebanon. Additionally, in recent years, Hezbollah has gained legitimacy in the public sector as they have won parliamentary elections. In a similar fashion, the Egyptian revolution did not begin as a religious revolution, yet the group who benefited the most from the downfall of Mubarak is the religious party, the Muslim Brotherhood.
In Lebanon, aside from any discussion about a national revolution, Hezbollah’s popularity is two-fold. First, they have an extensive social service network that functions the way the Lebanese government should function. After the Lebanese Civil War, the Lebanese government failed to provide social services and perform basic tasks such as collecting taxes and ensuring continuous electricity. Second, Hezbollah captures the support of the Lebanese people, ranging from Shi’a Muslims to Christians, because this small, non-governmental group is seen as the David fighting the Goliath, Israel. Even with military defeats, Hezbollah has the legitimacy and precedent that it can reconstruct and rehabilitate Lebanese society after war. It is necessary to understand the human psychology undermining the Lebanese support for them. The Lebanese people are deprived of dignity from their government that they crave a symbolic entity to confront Israel. Hezbollah has a creditable track record. Its momentum of a legitimate force in Lebanon was solidified after the 2006 war with Israel. Not to condone Hezbollah’s violence, but the rockets from Hezbollah into Israel were not uncommon. Therefore, when Israel attacked Lebanon, the Lebanese were surprised by Israel’s response and look towards Hezbollah to respond and protect them. Additionally, the Lebanese people have witnessed restraint on the part of Hezbollah. Several instances have occurred between Israel and Lebanon/Hezbollah that could have escalated into war, yet Hezbollah did not respond violently. One example includes the Palestinian march to the Israeli border for “al-Naqba” Day. According to Lebanese officials, Israel fired upon the unarmed, Palestinians demonstrators. Hezbollah’s lack of reaction indicates that they do not have interests in regular violence and overall, in the context of violence in Lebanon, it has remained cool-headed.
This cool-headedness certainly applies to the concern about Israeli-Iranian relations. While it is hard to predict what will happen in Lebanon, it is believed that events will not escalate in a violent manner in the immediate future. Rather, the rhetoric is more posturing and beating of the war drums than actually parties considering war. The momentum of the UNSC P5+1 seems to be accelerating so that negotiations, not war, and not violence in Lebanon will remain the present situation.
