Lessons from Afghanistan
by Tanay Paranjape
The controversy over the desecration of copies of the Koran in Afghanistan and the murder of Americans that followed is one of the many events that highlights American government’s fundamental misunderstanding of Afghanistan.
It is particularly important in the context of President Obama’s policy to draw down American troops. The United States hopes to transfer responsibility and authority to the government in Kabul and its national army and police force, which would run the country and its economy. Such an outcome, however, is highly unlikely as the Afghan national government does not have the support of a large segment of its population, the Pashtuns. The national army is regarded as an army of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras largely belonging to the old Northern Alliance that battled the Pashtuns throughout the 1990s. This is not the only problem facing the government in Kabul. The government is in a financially unviable situation. Afghanistan’s economy cannot support a large national government with a large standing army. Th e budget for Afghan security forces is around $12 billion. Th at is eight times the amount of the government’s annual revenue.
The United States installed the Karzai Government in Afghanistan and helped build its Armed forces without keeping in mind its financial viability, legitimacy and effectively. As they represent many Pashtuns, the Taliban will inevitably hold a significant influence in southern and eastern Afghanistan. More crucially, the United States will not be able to stop Pakistan’s government from maintaining sanctuaries for Taliban militants. No guerrilla movement that has had a set of sanctuaries let alone the active help of a powerful military like Pakistan’s has ever been eliminated.
Let us look at Afghanistan from a historical perspective to understand the manner in which the nation dealt with foreign aggressors. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42) resulted in a crushing defeat for Britain. After an initial successes in the battle, the British had to retreat back to India. This is considered to be one of the biggest defeats of Great Britain in Asia. The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80) saw a more favorable outcome for Great Britain. The war ended in the Treaty of Gandamak in which the Afghan ruler was granted domestic sovereignty but had to concede control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy to the Great Britain. The Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) also ended in an armistice between the two states. The Durand line (as per agreement in 1893) was reaffirmed as the boundary between British India and Afghanistan and Afghans gave an assurance not to formant trouble on the British side. In return they were granted full control of their foreign affairs as a fully independent state. The former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and occupied the state for 10 years. They were forced to leave owing to their inability to deal with the Mujahedin supported by the Pakistani, Saudi and American governments and Gorbachev’s desire to improve relations with the United States. The Soviet Union and Great Britain both fielded much superior armies than their Afghan counterparts in the respective times of invasion. Even still, both states were unable to maintain control over Afghanistan and had to retreat or settled for a treaty. This does not necessarily point to the machismo or bravado of the Afghan people but the difficult mountainous terrain, insurgency and unconventional warfare. The rugged terrain allows Afghans to retreat into the mountains, regroup and attack the invader. Afghans can then persist to be an irritant by periodically engaging the foreign aggressor in skirmishes. The Taliban conducts constant insurgency operations against the NATO and Afghan forces. The insurgency includes suicide bombing, assassination of key government officials and targeting NATO installations. The unconventional nature of warfare makes it impossible for the occupying force to be equipped to deal with the insurgents.
If America hoped to go into Afghanistan wipe out the Al Qaeda, modernize the country, install a Western style democracy favoring America all within a few years, it overlooked the fundamental characteristics of the Afghan society, ethnicity, religiosity, and national and geopolitical orientation. It does not mean that democracy is not compatible with Afghan people, but that a realistic and long lasting democracy should reflect opinions of all sections of the society. The present government does not represent Afghan society in its entirety and the Pashtuns persist to be alienated within the nation.
The United States needs to move to from its approach of nation building to counter terrorism to serve its objective in Afghanistan. A smaller troop presence can pursue robust counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The Taliban can be prevented from taking over the country again. Northern and eastern parts of Afghanistan populated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras will stay staunchly opposed to the Taliban. The United States should support these groups and ally with neighboring countries that support them. The natural, and historic, allies of the Northern Alliance are India, Iran and Russia; they have permanent interests that will keep them involved in the region. The United States should try to align her strategy with those countries’ strategies (obviously, the alignment will be tacit with Iran). At the same time political dialogue with the Taliban should be given increased importance.
The United States for the past 50 years has entered wars in developing countries with a simple strategy of nation building, with the hope of resolving its national security problems. Afghanistan is one of many examples that points to the fact that to meet national security goals a counter terrorism approach is much more effective. A counter terrorism approach would involve less bloodshed and would not be such a burden on U.S. treasury.
by Tanay Paranjape
The controversy over the desecration of copies of the Koran in Afghanistan and the murder of Americans that followed is one of the many events that highlights American government’s fundamental misunderstanding of Afghanistan.
It is particularly important in the context of President Obama’s policy to draw down American troops. The United States hopes to transfer responsibility and authority to the government in Kabul and its national army and police force, which would run the country and its economy. Such an outcome, however, is highly unlikely as the Afghan national government does not have the support of a large segment of its population, the Pashtuns. The national army is regarded as an army of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras largely belonging to the old Northern Alliance that battled the Pashtuns throughout the 1990s. This is not the only problem facing the government in Kabul. The government is in a financially unviable situation. Afghanistan’s economy cannot support a large national government with a large standing army. Th e budget for Afghan security forces is around $12 billion. Th at is eight times the amount of the government’s annual revenue.
The United States installed the Karzai Government in Afghanistan and helped build its Armed forces without keeping in mind its financial viability, legitimacy and effectively. As they represent many Pashtuns, the Taliban will inevitably hold a significant influence in southern and eastern Afghanistan. More crucially, the United States will not be able to stop Pakistan’s government from maintaining sanctuaries for Taliban militants. No guerrilla movement that has had a set of sanctuaries let alone the active help of a powerful military like Pakistan’s has ever been eliminated.
Let us look at Afghanistan from a historical perspective to understand the manner in which the nation dealt with foreign aggressors. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42) resulted in a crushing defeat for Britain. After an initial successes in the battle, the British had to retreat back to India. This is considered to be one of the biggest defeats of Great Britain in Asia. The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80) saw a more favorable outcome for Great Britain. The war ended in the Treaty of Gandamak in which the Afghan ruler was granted domestic sovereignty but had to concede control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy to the Great Britain. The Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) also ended in an armistice between the two states. The Durand line (as per agreement in 1893) was reaffirmed as the boundary between British India and Afghanistan and Afghans gave an assurance not to formant trouble on the British side. In return they were granted full control of their foreign affairs as a fully independent state. The former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and occupied the state for 10 years. They were forced to leave owing to their inability to deal with the Mujahedin supported by the Pakistani, Saudi and American governments and Gorbachev’s desire to improve relations with the United States. The Soviet Union and Great Britain both fielded much superior armies than their Afghan counterparts in the respective times of invasion. Even still, both states were unable to maintain control over Afghanistan and had to retreat or settled for a treaty. This does not necessarily point to the machismo or bravado of the Afghan people but the difficult mountainous terrain, insurgency and unconventional warfare. The rugged terrain allows Afghans to retreat into the mountains, regroup and attack the invader. Afghans can then persist to be an irritant by periodically engaging the foreign aggressor in skirmishes. The Taliban conducts constant insurgency operations against the NATO and Afghan forces. The insurgency includes suicide bombing, assassination of key government officials and targeting NATO installations. The unconventional nature of warfare makes it impossible for the occupying force to be equipped to deal with the insurgents.
If America hoped to go into Afghanistan wipe out the Al Qaeda, modernize the country, install a Western style democracy favoring America all within a few years, it overlooked the fundamental characteristics of the Afghan society, ethnicity, religiosity, and national and geopolitical orientation. It does not mean that democracy is not compatible with Afghan people, but that a realistic and long lasting democracy should reflect opinions of all sections of the society. The present government does not represent Afghan society in its entirety and the Pashtuns persist to be alienated within the nation.
The United States needs to move to from its approach of nation building to counter terrorism to serve its objective in Afghanistan. A smaller troop presence can pursue robust counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The Taliban can be prevented from taking over the country again. Northern and eastern parts of Afghanistan populated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras will stay staunchly opposed to the Taliban. The United States should support these groups and ally with neighboring countries that support them. The natural, and historic, allies of the Northern Alliance are India, Iran and Russia; they have permanent interests that will keep them involved in the region. The United States should try to align her strategy with those countries’ strategies (obviously, the alignment will be tacit with Iran). At the same time political dialogue with the Taliban should be given increased importance.
The United States for the past 50 years has entered wars in developing countries with a simple strategy of nation building, with the hope of resolving its national security problems. Afghanistan is one of many examples that points to the fact that to meet national security goals a counter terrorism approach is much more effective. A counter terrorism approach would involve less bloodshed and would not be such a burden on U.S. treasury.
