Priority for 21st Century Defense: A Sustainable U.S. Military Strategy
by Jieming Chu
Hit by an economic recession following a decade of two costly wars, the United States needs to reconsider its global military strategy. The Obama administration has released its military budget plan, which includes $487 billion in cuts over the next decade. An additional $500 billion in cuts may be possible if Congress agrees on plans for deeper reductions. Facing these significant budget cuts and corresponding reduction in military capabilities, the United States correspondingly alters its global military posture to maintain economy of force and to meet the new challenges posted by rising regional powers such as Iran and emerging global powers like China.
The proposed cuts would include a significant reduction on the cost of wars abroad, slashing it down from $115 billion to $88.5 billion. It would also cut bureaucracy in the Pentagon to save $60 billion over the next 5 years and structural costs of the armed forces to save $50 billion over the same period of time. T e army is expected to shrink by eight combat brigade teams; the marines are to eliminate six battalions and four tactical air squadrons; the air force is to disband six tactical air squadrons and the navy to retire seven of its older cruisers. Other cuts include cancelling procurement of certain weapon systems and slowing down the procurement of certain others. These fi nancial compromises have resulted in the United States officially abandoning its long-held “two war strategy”. Previous to this, the U.S. military adhered to the strategy of being able to actively fight two major wars at once.
Perceiving a significant downgrading in its military spending and knowing that it needs a more sustainable military posture in a coming decade of austerity, America has silently shifted its military priority away from Europe. In the past several years, the Department of Defense has closed down 140 facilities in Europe. Due to the cuts, U.S. military footprint in Europe will shrink more. Currently, there are four Battalion Combat Teams permanently stationed in Europe. This number will be reduced to four, leaving a total of 70,000 military personnel instead of 80,000 in Europe. While it is necessary that the U.S. should always keep its commitment to defend of Europe under the provisions set forth by NATO, it is more important to convince the European countries to become “producers” rather than “consumers” of security.
Despite these significant cuts, the United States has stressed that it would shift more of its military assets to the Asia-Pacific region in the future. In the newly released official document titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Asia-Pacific is placed as the top priority of the new global military posture of the United States. President Obama, at the news conference for the announcement of this new strategy, said that “We’ll be strengthening our presence in the Asia Pacific, and budget reductions will not come at the expense of this critical region.” This document singles out China as an emerging regional power which could potentially affect the U.S. economy and its security in the long term, stressing that China’s determined pursuit of Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities poses significant asymmetrical threat to U.S. power projection capabilities.
In addition to developing counter-measures to China’s A2/AD capabilities so that the United States can maintain its ability to operate close to the First Island Chain, the U.S. has also decided to take advantage of the geopolitical tensions caused by China’s increasing military power. It needs to further cooperation with the existing allies in the region and to develop more concrete and mutually beneficial relationships with other emerging partners such as India and Burma. U.S. military presence in the region will not only off set the increasingly aggressive diplomatic leverage of China, but also serve as a trip wire should any military conflict in the region, most specifically in the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea, happen. Such trip wire would cause the belligerent parties to think twice before going to war because it would force them to engage U.S. forces and bring the U.S. into conflict.
The new strategy also emphasizes the Middle East as a priority, naming extremist groups and Iran as the biggest threat to U.S. interest in the region. The U.S. diplomacy in Middle East has traditionally favored stability over anything else, even if the client regimes in power are authoritarian. After the Arab Spring, pressures within Arab nations and regime changes have produced incredible uncertainty for the future of Middle East. The reluctance of the international community to intervene militarily in Syria perfectly demonstrates this concern about instability in the region. As Iran continues to pursue its dubious nuclear program, the threat of nuclear proliferation increases drastically. In order to counter this threat, the U.S. needs to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons through a combination of diplomatic negotiations and military deterrence. It also needs to render ineffective the Iranian threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the new strategy specifically points out the importance of hunting down extremist groups to prevent them from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction.
The new strategy, in general, focuses heavily on developing a “Smart Defense” approach which stresses a creation of economy of force rather than retreating towards isolationism. It is both inevitable in the sense that the poor global and domestic economic conditions are forcing the United States to adopt a more sustainable defense policy, but also innovative in that the U.S. can specialize in off setting immediate asymmetrical threats posed around the globe. The cuts and the introduction of a more efficient new strategy will also benefit the United States in a way that it would force the U.S. military to develop more advanced technologies and to tailor its operations to better explore the full potential of the combined power of force and diplomacy.
by Jieming Chu
Hit by an economic recession following a decade of two costly wars, the United States needs to reconsider its global military strategy. The Obama administration has released its military budget plan, which includes $487 billion in cuts over the next decade. An additional $500 billion in cuts may be possible if Congress agrees on plans for deeper reductions. Facing these significant budget cuts and corresponding reduction in military capabilities, the United States correspondingly alters its global military posture to maintain economy of force and to meet the new challenges posted by rising regional powers such as Iran and emerging global powers like China.
The proposed cuts would include a significant reduction on the cost of wars abroad, slashing it down from $115 billion to $88.5 billion. It would also cut bureaucracy in the Pentagon to save $60 billion over the next 5 years and structural costs of the armed forces to save $50 billion over the same period of time. T e army is expected to shrink by eight combat brigade teams; the marines are to eliminate six battalions and four tactical air squadrons; the air force is to disband six tactical air squadrons and the navy to retire seven of its older cruisers. Other cuts include cancelling procurement of certain weapon systems and slowing down the procurement of certain others. These fi nancial compromises have resulted in the United States officially abandoning its long-held “two war strategy”. Previous to this, the U.S. military adhered to the strategy of being able to actively fight two major wars at once.
Perceiving a significant downgrading in its military spending and knowing that it needs a more sustainable military posture in a coming decade of austerity, America has silently shifted its military priority away from Europe. In the past several years, the Department of Defense has closed down 140 facilities in Europe. Due to the cuts, U.S. military footprint in Europe will shrink more. Currently, there are four Battalion Combat Teams permanently stationed in Europe. This number will be reduced to four, leaving a total of 70,000 military personnel instead of 80,000 in Europe. While it is necessary that the U.S. should always keep its commitment to defend of Europe under the provisions set forth by NATO, it is more important to convince the European countries to become “producers” rather than “consumers” of security.
Despite these significant cuts, the United States has stressed that it would shift more of its military assets to the Asia-Pacific region in the future. In the newly released official document titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Asia-Pacific is placed as the top priority of the new global military posture of the United States. President Obama, at the news conference for the announcement of this new strategy, said that “We’ll be strengthening our presence in the Asia Pacific, and budget reductions will not come at the expense of this critical region.” This document singles out China as an emerging regional power which could potentially affect the U.S. economy and its security in the long term, stressing that China’s determined pursuit of Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities poses significant asymmetrical threat to U.S. power projection capabilities.
In addition to developing counter-measures to China’s A2/AD capabilities so that the United States can maintain its ability to operate close to the First Island Chain, the U.S. has also decided to take advantage of the geopolitical tensions caused by China’s increasing military power. It needs to further cooperation with the existing allies in the region and to develop more concrete and mutually beneficial relationships with other emerging partners such as India and Burma. U.S. military presence in the region will not only off set the increasingly aggressive diplomatic leverage of China, but also serve as a trip wire should any military conflict in the region, most specifically in the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea, happen. Such trip wire would cause the belligerent parties to think twice before going to war because it would force them to engage U.S. forces and bring the U.S. into conflict.
The new strategy also emphasizes the Middle East as a priority, naming extremist groups and Iran as the biggest threat to U.S. interest in the region. The U.S. diplomacy in Middle East has traditionally favored stability over anything else, even if the client regimes in power are authoritarian. After the Arab Spring, pressures within Arab nations and regime changes have produced incredible uncertainty for the future of Middle East. The reluctance of the international community to intervene militarily in Syria perfectly demonstrates this concern about instability in the region. As Iran continues to pursue its dubious nuclear program, the threat of nuclear proliferation increases drastically. In order to counter this threat, the U.S. needs to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons through a combination of diplomatic negotiations and military deterrence. It also needs to render ineffective the Iranian threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the new strategy specifically points out the importance of hunting down extremist groups to prevent them from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction.
The new strategy, in general, focuses heavily on developing a “Smart Defense” approach which stresses a creation of economy of force rather than retreating towards isolationism. It is both inevitable in the sense that the poor global and domestic economic conditions are forcing the United States to adopt a more sustainable defense policy, but also innovative in that the U.S. can specialize in off setting immediate asymmetrical threats posed around the globe. The cuts and the introduction of a more efficient new strategy will also benefit the United States in a way that it would force the U.S. military to develop more advanced technologies and to tailor its operations to better explore the full potential of the combined power of force and diplomacy.
