Recent NGO Crisis Exposes Divisions in Egyptian Politics
by Justin Burack
On December 29th, Egyptian security forces raided the offices of several foreign-funded NGO’s, including the Washington-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), The International Republican Institute (IRI), The Arab Centre for Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP), and Freedom House. Democratic activists within Egypt, and foreign governments, subsequently accused the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of orchestrating the raid, and cast doubt upon the SCAF’s willingness to lead a successful transition to democratic rule. In spite of their protestations, Egyptian prosecutors indicted 47 NGO members under various charges stemming from the Mubarak-era Law on Associations, including operating unlicensed ventures, money laundering, and receiving foreign funds without government permission. The scandal reveals much to the observer about how Egypt’s various post-revolutionary factions encapsulate their agendas, and their place on the proverbial totem pole. The response of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, as the most deeply entrenched and diversified actor within Egyptian civil society, has wide-reaching implications for how democratization will proceed in the country.
Responsibility for the raid itself has generally fallen on Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Aboul-Naga, considered by many Egyptian activists and much of the printed media as an avatar of the previous regime and the “right hand” of Mohammad Hussein Tantawi, the leader of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. In reality a zealot when it comes to ‘Egypt’s sovereignty’, she was known to regularly stymie Egypt’s negotiations with the IMF during the Mubarak era and was generally hated by foreign diplomats. However, tensions had been rising between the SCAF and democracy campaigners since July, when the SCAF posted numerous communiques on its Facebook page accusing foreign funded NGO’s of pursuing subversive activities within the country and fomenting unrest. At least some of the targeted organizations were involved in election monitoring according to Julie Hughes of the National Endowment for Democracy.
The impasse over foreign funding of NGO’s comes during a state of flux within Egyptian politics. The Muslim Brotherhood, regarded as a fifth column under the Mubarak regime, is adopting a preeminent role in drafting Egypt’s new constitution as Mohammed Saad al-Katatni of the Freedom and Justice Party, the Brotherhood’s new political wing, begins to lead discussions within the newly elected Parliament. As Egypt’s largest religious civil society organization, commanding a strong social presence among Egypt’s disaffected and professionals alike, the Brotherhood’s transformation from resistance organization to elite was to be expected.
The nascent secular parties have therefore wasted little time in using the NGO crisis to attempt to undermine the Brotherhood and question its commitment to liberal values. Alarmed at the growing visibility and power of the Islamist organization and its traditionally secretive internal structure, secular and liberal factions are accusing the Brotherhood of solecisms ranging from a lack of transparency to complicity in the growing authority of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Sanaa al-Said of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party recently accused the Brotherhood in a Parliamentary session of operating outside the law deliberately. Indeed, among its many social outreach programs and sources of funding, only the Brotherhood’s charitable activities are registered under the Law of Associations - which requires all organizations greater than ten members to obtain a license from the Ministry of Social Solidarity. In pursuance of this accusation, human rights lawyer Mohammad el-Adly noted that the Brotherhood has not proposed any meaningful amendments to the draconian NGO law which could allow it to attain legal status without threat of prosecution by the Egyptian security apparati.
Brotherhood officials have mostly responded that it is simply too soon after the revolution for the Society to open itself to government audit, and that the main priority should be the establishment of a clear democratic rule of law. Furthermore, they argue, the Brotherhood was never officially outlawed, since Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1955, only disbanded the organization through a verbal order and not an official communique. By implication, the Brotherhood does not have any pressing need to declare all of its operations and sources of funding to an oversight committee.
In light of current developments, and its own experience with government repression and betrayal, the Brotherhood’s concerns about the rule of law appear justified. Following the arrest of the NGO workers, the judges presiding over the case against them adjourned the trial until April, and afterwards recused themselves from the trial citing political interference. A few days afterwards, a travel ban was lifted against 16 foreign defendants, including 13 Americans, following relentless pressure from Washington and threats to withdraw a desperately needed financial aid package.
In spite of the absence of any direct culprit, the move was condemned across the political spectrum as undue interference in Egypt’s judiciary system by the military authorities, and a capitulation to foreign interests. The lead judge in the case, Mohammad Shukry, told al-Ahram during an interview that there had been interference in his work, while former presidential candidate and Nobel Prize winner Mohammad el-Baradei stated that interference in the judicial process could constitute a “fatal blow” to Egyptian democracy. Complicating the matter for the authorities was Senator John McCain’s statement, being the head of the International Republican Institute (one of the raided NGO’s) as well as US government spokesman, that he had met with Hussein Tantawi and members of the SCAF and the Brotherhood, and that the Brotherhood had played a role in organizing the lifting of the travel ban.
Meanwhile, the Brotherhood appears to be using this whole affair to poise itself as the guardian of civil society. Throughout the post-revolutionary period, they have explicitly denied that they made any favorable deals with the SCAF and plan on holding the military accountable to a civilian administration. Throughout the period of posturing that followed the raids and before the li fting of the travel ban, Brotherhood members appeared to oppose the judiciary’s view of foreign civil society. Supreme Guide Mohammad el-Badie wrote that “All political, intellectual, social, cultural and economic trends and forces in the country -- along with civil society -- must be allowed to operate and express their views.” Mohammad Katatni, in a press statement immediately following the raid, accused the SCAF of greater mendacity than the Mubarak regime in conducting the raids. As the SCAF has made promises to lead a transition to a democratic government, and indeed riots have erupted in Tahrir Square over any perceived lapse in its ability to honor that promise, it is in no position to subdue a deeply-rooted organization like the Brotherhood lest it provoke major civil unrest. The Brotherhood’s position as an agent of political decentralization vis a vis the military authorities therefore appears secure.
However, the Islamist-led parliament has responded to the release of the 16 foreign NGO workers by announcing that it will summon SCAF appointed Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri for questioning on March 11. There have been no statements from any MPs as to whether they plan on questioning officials tied to the military and security institutions themselves, and could indicate that in spite of harsh rhetoric issued by Freedom and Justice Party politicians following the release, the Brotherhood is unwilling to compromise its newly-found gains in prestige before a constitution is drafted and presidential elections are held in May.
Ultimately, it seems, the transition to democracy is only being carried out on the military’s terms with respect to civil society organizations. The SCAF’s image as the leader of Egypt’s democratic transition; indexed by their ostensible amiability towards charging the defendants under civil Egyptian law, while accusing them of fomenting unrest on behalf of intelligence agencies; was compromised by their willingness to negotiate with American partners and politicians, including John McCain, over their release. The other major player, the Brotherhood, has issued threats to the United States regarding foreign intervention in Egypt’s internal affairs, particularly implying that a Brotherhood-led government would have grounds to alter the peace treaty with Israel if aid was withdrawn, which indicates a growing assertiveness. It is still too insecure in its power, however, to challenge the military rulers in any meaningful sense. While a constitution has yet to be put into effect, it remains to be seen what form the prevailing dynamic between civil society and the security institutions will take. Meanwhile, the U.S., the SCAF, and the Brotherhood all appear to have lost face.
by Justin Burack
On December 29th, Egyptian security forces raided the offices of several foreign-funded NGO’s, including the Washington-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), The International Republican Institute (IRI), The Arab Centre for Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP), and Freedom House. Democratic activists within Egypt, and foreign governments, subsequently accused the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of orchestrating the raid, and cast doubt upon the SCAF’s willingness to lead a successful transition to democratic rule. In spite of their protestations, Egyptian prosecutors indicted 47 NGO members under various charges stemming from the Mubarak-era Law on Associations, including operating unlicensed ventures, money laundering, and receiving foreign funds without government permission. The scandal reveals much to the observer about how Egypt’s various post-revolutionary factions encapsulate their agendas, and their place on the proverbial totem pole. The response of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, as the most deeply entrenched and diversified actor within Egyptian civil society, has wide-reaching implications for how democratization will proceed in the country.
Responsibility for the raid itself has generally fallen on Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Aboul-Naga, considered by many Egyptian activists and much of the printed media as an avatar of the previous regime and the “right hand” of Mohammad Hussein Tantawi, the leader of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. In reality a zealot when it comes to ‘Egypt’s sovereignty’, she was known to regularly stymie Egypt’s negotiations with the IMF during the Mubarak era and was generally hated by foreign diplomats. However, tensions had been rising between the SCAF and democracy campaigners since July, when the SCAF posted numerous communiques on its Facebook page accusing foreign funded NGO’s of pursuing subversive activities within the country and fomenting unrest. At least some of the targeted organizations were involved in election monitoring according to Julie Hughes of the National Endowment for Democracy.
The impasse over foreign funding of NGO’s comes during a state of flux within Egyptian politics. The Muslim Brotherhood, regarded as a fifth column under the Mubarak regime, is adopting a preeminent role in drafting Egypt’s new constitution as Mohammed Saad al-Katatni of the Freedom and Justice Party, the Brotherhood’s new political wing, begins to lead discussions within the newly elected Parliament. As Egypt’s largest religious civil society organization, commanding a strong social presence among Egypt’s disaffected and professionals alike, the Brotherhood’s transformation from resistance organization to elite was to be expected.
The nascent secular parties have therefore wasted little time in using the NGO crisis to attempt to undermine the Brotherhood and question its commitment to liberal values. Alarmed at the growing visibility and power of the Islamist organization and its traditionally secretive internal structure, secular and liberal factions are accusing the Brotherhood of solecisms ranging from a lack of transparency to complicity in the growing authority of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Sanaa al-Said of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party recently accused the Brotherhood in a Parliamentary session of operating outside the law deliberately. Indeed, among its many social outreach programs and sources of funding, only the Brotherhood’s charitable activities are registered under the Law of Associations - which requires all organizations greater than ten members to obtain a license from the Ministry of Social Solidarity. In pursuance of this accusation, human rights lawyer Mohammad el-Adly noted that the Brotherhood has not proposed any meaningful amendments to the draconian NGO law which could allow it to attain legal status without threat of prosecution by the Egyptian security apparati.
Brotherhood officials have mostly responded that it is simply too soon after the revolution for the Society to open itself to government audit, and that the main priority should be the establishment of a clear democratic rule of law. Furthermore, they argue, the Brotherhood was never officially outlawed, since Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1955, only disbanded the organization through a verbal order and not an official communique. By implication, the Brotherhood does not have any pressing need to declare all of its operations and sources of funding to an oversight committee.
In light of current developments, and its own experience with government repression and betrayal, the Brotherhood’s concerns about the rule of law appear justified. Following the arrest of the NGO workers, the judges presiding over the case against them adjourned the trial until April, and afterwards recused themselves from the trial citing political interference. A few days afterwards, a travel ban was lifted against 16 foreign defendants, including 13 Americans, following relentless pressure from Washington and threats to withdraw a desperately needed financial aid package.
In spite of the absence of any direct culprit, the move was condemned across the political spectrum as undue interference in Egypt’s judiciary system by the military authorities, and a capitulation to foreign interests. The lead judge in the case, Mohammad Shukry, told al-Ahram during an interview that there had been interference in his work, while former presidential candidate and Nobel Prize winner Mohammad el-Baradei stated that interference in the judicial process could constitute a “fatal blow” to Egyptian democracy. Complicating the matter for the authorities was Senator John McCain’s statement, being the head of the International Republican Institute (one of the raided NGO’s) as well as US government spokesman, that he had met with Hussein Tantawi and members of the SCAF and the Brotherhood, and that the Brotherhood had played a role in organizing the lifting of the travel ban.
Meanwhile, the Brotherhood appears to be using this whole affair to poise itself as the guardian of civil society. Throughout the post-revolutionary period, they have explicitly denied that they made any favorable deals with the SCAF and plan on holding the military accountable to a civilian administration. Throughout the period of posturing that followed the raids and before the li fting of the travel ban, Brotherhood members appeared to oppose the judiciary’s view of foreign civil society. Supreme Guide Mohammad el-Badie wrote that “All political, intellectual, social, cultural and economic trends and forces in the country -- along with civil society -- must be allowed to operate and express their views.” Mohammad Katatni, in a press statement immediately following the raid, accused the SCAF of greater mendacity than the Mubarak regime in conducting the raids. As the SCAF has made promises to lead a transition to a democratic government, and indeed riots have erupted in Tahrir Square over any perceived lapse in its ability to honor that promise, it is in no position to subdue a deeply-rooted organization like the Brotherhood lest it provoke major civil unrest. The Brotherhood’s position as an agent of political decentralization vis a vis the military authorities therefore appears secure.
However, the Islamist-led parliament has responded to the release of the 16 foreign NGO workers by announcing that it will summon SCAF appointed Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri for questioning on March 11. There have been no statements from any MPs as to whether they plan on questioning officials tied to the military and security institutions themselves, and could indicate that in spite of harsh rhetoric issued by Freedom and Justice Party politicians following the release, the Brotherhood is unwilling to compromise its newly-found gains in prestige before a constitution is drafted and presidential elections are held in May.
Ultimately, it seems, the transition to democracy is only being carried out on the military’s terms with respect to civil society organizations. The SCAF’s image as the leader of Egypt’s democratic transition; indexed by their ostensible amiability towards charging the defendants under civil Egyptian law, while accusing them of fomenting unrest on behalf of intelligence agencies; was compromised by their willingness to negotiate with American partners and politicians, including John McCain, over their release. The other major player, the Brotherhood, has issued threats to the United States regarding foreign intervention in Egypt’s internal affairs, particularly implying that a Brotherhood-led government would have grounds to alter the peace treaty with Israel if aid was withdrawn, which indicates a growing assertiveness. It is still too insecure in its power, however, to challenge the military rulers in any meaningful sense. While a constitution has yet to be put into effect, it remains to be seen what form the prevailing dynamic between civil society and the security institutions will take. Meanwhile, the U.S., the SCAF, and the Brotherhood all appear to have lost face.
