The Politics of Destabilization: Interpreting Al Shabaab’s “Terrorist Attack” in Kenya
by Karia Sekumbo
On September 21 2013, a shooting, bombing and killing spree at Westgate Mall in Nairobi by Somali based militant group Al-Shabaab left 72 people dead and 175 injured. In the wake of a standoff between Al-Shabaab and Kenyan security forces, a sense of instability, insecurity and fear spread across the nation. The last time an incident occurred where foreign forces staged an attack inside Kenya was the ‘Al Qaeda’ sponsored terrorist attacks that had taken place at the USA embassy in Nairobi on August 7th 1998. Although the attack was dismissed as a wanton terrorist attack, a history of Kenya-Somali relations reveals a more complicated story.
Kenyan Somali Relations
Al Shabaab’s history stems from its affiliation with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the former government in charge of Somalia. In the wake of the Global War on Terror began by the Bush Administration, post 9/11 relations between the ICU and the U.S. soured as the ICU was earmarked as a potential terrorist hotbed. The ICU came under a series of attacks from a foreign sponsored Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism. The subsequent ouster of the ICU from governance in Somalia led to its fragmentation and the formation of a series of breakaway factions including Al Shabaab. However, due to its style of combat, Al Shabaab was also classified as a terrorist organization by the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Norway, Sweden and Canada.
Known as Operation “Linda Nchi” (Protect the Nation), the Kenyan army has been fighting Al Shabaab in Southern Somalia, alongside the current official Somali government, the African Union and with some additional foreign assistance. The goal of this mission is to drive out Al Shabaab from the Somali territory and hence secure Kenya’s borders. Kenya’s position South of Somalia serves as a strategic point as Kenya can be used as a base to project support to the forces operating in Southern Somalia.
As a result of the continued attacks from Kenya and the supporting groups, Al Shabaab, has been on the retreat. Nevertheless, Al Shabaab still views itself as a legitimate governing authority within Somalia. The continued intervention by foreign countries is interpreted as an attack on Somalian sovereignty. Kenya’s involvement through Operation Linda Nchi makes it a strategic enemy as it is supporting the foreign aggression on Somalian territory. Destabilization through guerilla attacks hereby serves as a means of continually dissuading Kenya from sending troops and acting as a base for foreign engagement within Somalia.
Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for this attack shortly after the number of civilians killed was announced. Following their claim, a series of warnings were issued stating that Kenyan forces should withdraw from Somalia or more attacks will take place. Given Nairobi’s considerable distance from the Somali border, such a threat should not be taken lightly as it points to the possibility and probability of more Al Shabaab forces operating in Kenya; waiting and planning to orchestrate another attack.
Going Forward
Kenya's participation in this affair is a strategic one. It serves as a military base for counter terrorism initiatives in Somalia. However, given the governments' emphasis on tourism (12.1% of GDP) and FDI as a means of driving the economy, the recent terrorist attacks on a major tourist destination also relay a sense of economic instability within Kenya. Further attacks will undermine a sense of security within the nation and could decrease the level of foreign participation within the economy.
Therefore, a decision ultimately has to be made by the Kenyan leadership: either intensify attacks or withdraw from Somalia. On one hand, fully reengaging within the region will demonstrate Kenya's resolve to deal with any threats to the nation. however, doing so may likely amplify the risk of future guerilla attacks within Kenya by Al-Shabaab. Withdrawing on the other hand may ensure short-term security. However it will surely display a weaker, if not shaken leadership. Also, given Kenya's significant strategic location, any attempts at withdrawing from the region also poses a threat of alienation from the Western powers who have used Kenya as a location to base their operations within Somalia.
The goals of destabilization by Al Shabaab have undeniably been met. A stunned population, an alerted international community, and a decisive ultimatum to the Kenyan leadership were the ultimate priorities of the attack. It is solely on these lines that the Kenyan leadership must decide whether its national security interests are maintained by continuing to fight in Southern Somalia. Similarly, the political and economic considerations have to also be incorporated into the question as continued engagement may also mean more adverse consequences for the Kenyan population and economy.
Kenyan Somali Relations
Al Shabaab’s history stems from its affiliation with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the former government in charge of Somalia. In the wake of the Global War on Terror began by the Bush Administration, post 9/11 relations between the ICU and the U.S. soured as the ICU was earmarked as a potential terrorist hotbed. The ICU came under a series of attacks from a foreign sponsored Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism. The subsequent ouster of the ICU from governance in Somalia led to its fragmentation and the formation of a series of breakaway factions including Al Shabaab. However, due to its style of combat, Al Shabaab was also classified as a terrorist organization by the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Norway, Sweden and Canada.
Known as Operation “Linda Nchi” (Protect the Nation), the Kenyan army has been fighting Al Shabaab in Southern Somalia, alongside the current official Somali government, the African Union and with some additional foreign assistance. The goal of this mission is to drive out Al Shabaab from the Somali territory and hence secure Kenya’s borders. Kenya’s position South of Somalia serves as a strategic point as Kenya can be used as a base to project support to the forces operating in Southern Somalia.
As a result of the continued attacks from Kenya and the supporting groups, Al Shabaab, has been on the retreat. Nevertheless, Al Shabaab still views itself as a legitimate governing authority within Somalia. The continued intervention by foreign countries is interpreted as an attack on Somalian sovereignty. Kenya’s involvement through Operation Linda Nchi makes it a strategic enemy as it is supporting the foreign aggression on Somalian territory. Destabilization through guerilla attacks hereby serves as a means of continually dissuading Kenya from sending troops and acting as a base for foreign engagement within Somalia.
Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for this attack shortly after the number of civilians killed was announced. Following their claim, a series of warnings were issued stating that Kenyan forces should withdraw from Somalia or more attacks will take place. Given Nairobi’s considerable distance from the Somali border, such a threat should not be taken lightly as it points to the possibility and probability of more Al Shabaab forces operating in Kenya; waiting and planning to orchestrate another attack.
Going Forward
Kenya's participation in this affair is a strategic one. It serves as a military base for counter terrorism initiatives in Somalia. However, given the governments' emphasis on tourism (12.1% of GDP) and FDI as a means of driving the economy, the recent terrorist attacks on a major tourist destination also relay a sense of economic instability within Kenya. Further attacks will undermine a sense of security within the nation and could decrease the level of foreign participation within the economy.
Therefore, a decision ultimately has to be made by the Kenyan leadership: either intensify attacks or withdraw from Somalia. On one hand, fully reengaging within the region will demonstrate Kenya's resolve to deal with any threats to the nation. however, doing so may likely amplify the risk of future guerilla attacks within Kenya by Al-Shabaab. Withdrawing on the other hand may ensure short-term security. However it will surely display a weaker, if not shaken leadership. Also, given Kenya's significant strategic location, any attempts at withdrawing from the region also poses a threat of alienation from the Western powers who have used Kenya as a location to base their operations within Somalia.
The goals of destabilization by Al Shabaab have undeniably been met. A stunned population, an alerted international community, and a decisive ultimatum to the Kenyan leadership were the ultimate priorities of the attack. It is solely on these lines that the Kenyan leadership must decide whether its national security interests are maintained by continuing to fight in Southern Somalia. Similarly, the political and economic considerations have to also be incorporated into the question as continued engagement may also mean more adverse consequences for the Kenyan population and economy.
