The Problem of Bouterse: On the Discontinuation of Dutch Foreign Aid in Suriname
by Jeferson Seth McIntyre
In recent years, the longstanding bilateral aid relationship between Suriname and its former colonial power the Netherlands has begun to unravel. While the cutting aid will do little to affect the credibility of the Netherlands, a non-negotiable political solution between the two countries will undoubtedly change foreign policy in Suriname. Such political recourse has the potential to permeate through large swaths of Surinamese society, restructuring two-way trade relationships, damaging communications between the Surinamese diaspora and Suriname, and negatively affecting international development efforts to lift the Suriname out of poverty.
The political schism between the two countries extends nearly four decades, to the years following independence. After the 1975 independence of Suriname, the Netherlands “ruled the national roost in Suriname, controlling nearly every facet of life, supporting political parties of its choice and generally running the relationship between Suriname and the country from The Hague”.(i) But the relationship between Suriname and theNetherlands was forever changed following the 1980 military coup led by Sargent Dési Bouterse, overthrowing Dutch ally and then Surinamese President Henck Arron, and establishing a dictatorial regime under the guise of a socialist republic. However, support for a democratic civilian government proved to be a major catalyst for mass dissension against Bouterse, leading to one of the most horrific periods of Surinamese history. In 1982, by order of Bouterse, fifteen leftist political figures were executed over the course of three days in front of his headquarters in Fort Zeelandia- events now known as the “December Murders.”
Shortly after the coup, Bouterse fought a civil war against a large contingent of afro-Surinamese living in the interior of Suriname and gained short-lived popularity. By the 90s, Bouterse had lost popular support and removed himself from politics. This was followed by a period of devastating economic mismanagement. In 1997, atfer almost ten years of heavy government spending and declining public services, the Surinamese government was confronted with high unemployment, disgruntled foreign investors, high inflation, and perpetually increasing poverty. With the current government’s support at an all-time low, Bouterse saw his chance. In an attempt to reinvigorate the Surinamese economy, Bouterse allied with his former enemy, afro-Surinamese leader, Ronnie Brunswijk,(ii) forming a political bloc strong enough to overthrow the incumbent party. His economic platform called for a re-envisioning of the foreign investment climate, and advocated strongly for increased trade with the Chinese, whose non-interventionist policies drew attention from the political contention of Bouterse’s human rights abuses. By 2010, with the assistance of the afro-Surinamese votes made possible by the coalition with Brunswijk, Bouterse was elected president of Suriname.
Meanwhile, allegations of drug trafficking led to the in absentia conviction of President Bouterse by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison and a $2.3 million fine “for running a cocaine smuggling ring” in Suriname.(iii) The lack of an extradition treaty between the two nations makes the sentencing legally impossible insofar as Bouterse remains in Suriname.(iv,v)
Bouterse’s legal protection runs deep in Suriname. Yet another attempt to bring Bouterse to justice backfired when a key witness in the December Murders decided to step forward. On the day of his testimony, the Surinamese parliament passed an amnesty law for the 24 suspected members of the December Murders, including Bouterse. The referendum of amnesty barred any criminal action taken against the perpetrators of the December Murders and the Surinamese Civil War. Shortly thereafter, a larger scale campaign for justice was initiated by many international human rights organizations (including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), calling for a retraction of the law and a trial for Bouterse.
In response to the referendum, the Netherlands acrimoniously suspended all foreign aid entering the country. Their new policy—essentially “smoke-em-out” economics—culminated in the dissolution of a decades-long bilateral aid agreement between the two countries, an estimated 20 million euros per year, which made up a substantial percentage of Surinamese spending on public services as well as funding for Non-Governmental Organizations. In reply, Bouterse forwent Latin Americathe option to name an ambassador to The Hague. In an address at the 37th annual Surinamese independence celebrations, Bouterse declaimed, “The time when we had to answer to the people on the North Sea is over. We understand that our diplomatic representation in the Netherlands needs to be reinforced and we have already studied a few options. However, we will retain relations on the level of a charge des affairs.”(vi)
The actions of the Netherlands reflect a greater pattern in an increasingly conservative foreign policy agenda. In 1986, the Netherlands, with support from the United States, nearly launched an invasion of Suriname to arrest Bouterse.(vii) In the post-9/11 world, the Dutch have shifted their foreign policy to reflect an increased attention to “political will...and the degree to which countries enjoy peace and security”(viii) and the political complications created by the slippery “relationship between development policy and security.”(ix) Exemplifying the complications of such a policy, Foreign Afairs Minister Maxime Verhagen agreed to “business relations,” but, in regards to Bouterse, he emphasized, “he is not welcome [in the Netherlands], except to serve his sentence.”(x)
As one of the biggest supporters of developmental aid the world over, the government of the Netherlands contributes 4.6 billion euros annually “towards the development of partner countries”(xi) in pursuit of the eight Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, the Netherlands is increasing the scope of its aid policies, aligning development aid criteria with “humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and impendence...” so as to protect “humanitarian aid from being equated with politics.”(xii) The double standard the Netherlands holds Suriname to is emblematic of its new position on foreign politics: security and justice before development. While this tactic makes more sense in countries on the verge of, or entrenched in, conflict, the post-conflict society of Suriname would be better served through apolitical developmental aid and building the capacity of local NGOs. Ideological determination towards international justice undermines the many factors that contribute to an equitable society.
The dissolution of the Surinamese/Dutch aid agreement presents a number of potentially harmful scenarios for the most disadvantaged of Suriname’s population. Suriname is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere with roughly 27% of the population surviving on $2 a day, 16% of the population subsisting on $1.25 a day, and 7% multi-dimensionally poor as defined by the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).(xiii) Despite multiple attempts to address the issue, unemployment has caused stagnation in all other dimensions of Surinamese life. The public suffers from poverty and unemployment, the Surinamese government spends a large component of public resources maintaining its power over the country, and the private sector is devoid of adequate investment capital due to the bureaucratic maze institutionalized by the government. Mining remains a ubiquitous component of economic activity, but low job security, gender imbalance, and the dangers associated with working in the interior ensures only a fraction of the population participates in this type of work.
What then keeps the country’s economy functioning? With almost “a one for one” ratio of Surinamese in Suriname to those of Surinamese ancestry in the Netherlands, remittances to the country are substantial. In fact, the IMF found in 2012 that public investment, “buoyed by strong activity in the oil and gold sectors,” has had a substantial effect on the state of the economy.(xiv) These findings, however, also showed remittances were not reducing poverty within the country because the investment climate in Suriname was not suitable for generating new capital. This suggests that additional aid revenue for domestic infrastructure has the potential to address both the need for initial investment in sustainable infrastructure and employment for the poor.
In 2001, the Surinamese drafted and adopted the Multi-annual Development Plan (MDP 2001-2005), which shifted its trade goals away from economic self-sufficiency and towards new policy objectives. The plan advocated for increased work in “macroeconomic stability, reduction of poverty through economic growth and the creation of employment, creation of a climate conducive to private sector development, and sustainable development and protection of the environment.”(xv) The Multi-annual Development Plan proposed the intervention of sustainable economic growth with considerations to those in poverty. However, with Dutch foreign aid at a standstill, it remains to be seen whether or not this project will continue.
It is unlikely that the withholding of Dutch Aid will have a significant effect on Bouterse. Chinese investment will insure that enough liquid capital exists in the country to maintain the status quo. The Dutch, on the other hand, stand to lose somewhat their image as bastions of internal justice, being the power most likely to resolve the conflict, and yet wholly unable to do so. To Bouterse’s credit, he has resolved many of the ethnic problems that faced his country and made progress against the inflation that had grown since the 1990s. In his older years, he has shown stubborn yet less brash behavior, and this, if anything, guarantees a somewhat peaceful Surinamese society. Bouterse would be wise to remain where he is, managing the only country he has left. The Dutch would be wise to consider all policy avenues for international aid intervention.
i. Wilkinson, Bert. Diplomatic War Between the Netherlands and Suriname Continues. The New York Amsterdam News. November 22 – November 28, 2012.
ii. Ramdharie, Stieven. “Enorme Winst Voor Bouterse in Suriname. “Volkskrant-nl.”
iii. “Suriname strongman guilty of drug charge.” Chicago Tribune News.
iv. Romero, Simon, “Returned to power, a leader celebrates a checkered past.” Te New York Times.
v. Romero, Simon. Long memories may ensnare a dictator. Te New York Times.
vi. Wilkinson. Diplomatic War.
vii. “The Netherlands planned U.S.-supported invasion of Suriname in 1986.” BNO News.
viii. The Development Policy of the Netherlands. Government of the Netherlands.
ix. Lopes Cadozo, The hidden crisis: armed conflict and education: Dutch aid to education and conflict. Education for All Global Monitoring Report. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
x. Government of the Netherlands, Development Policy.
xi. Ibid.
xii. Aid for people in need. Policy Framework for Humanitarian Aid. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
xiii. Country Briefing: Suriname. Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) At A Glance July 2010. Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). University of Oxford Press 2010.
xiv. Dwarkasing, Malty Shanti-Devi. Government Debt and Sustainable Development in Suriname: An assessment of the effect of the debt and the macroeconomic stability in 2008-2012 on human development indicators. Bureau Voor de Stattsschuld. Suriname Debt Management Office. Paramaribo.
xv. Trade Policy Review: Suriname. Trade Policy Regime: Framework and Objectives. World Trade Organization (2004).
by Jeferson Seth McIntyre
In recent years, the longstanding bilateral aid relationship between Suriname and its former colonial power the Netherlands has begun to unravel. While the cutting aid will do little to affect the credibility of the Netherlands, a non-negotiable political solution between the two countries will undoubtedly change foreign policy in Suriname. Such political recourse has the potential to permeate through large swaths of Surinamese society, restructuring two-way trade relationships, damaging communications between the Surinamese diaspora and Suriname, and negatively affecting international development efforts to lift the Suriname out of poverty.
The political schism between the two countries extends nearly four decades, to the years following independence. After the 1975 independence of Suriname, the Netherlands “ruled the national roost in Suriname, controlling nearly every facet of life, supporting political parties of its choice and generally running the relationship between Suriname and the country from The Hague”.(i) But the relationship between Suriname and theNetherlands was forever changed following the 1980 military coup led by Sargent Dési Bouterse, overthrowing Dutch ally and then Surinamese President Henck Arron, and establishing a dictatorial regime under the guise of a socialist republic. However, support for a democratic civilian government proved to be a major catalyst for mass dissension against Bouterse, leading to one of the most horrific periods of Surinamese history. In 1982, by order of Bouterse, fifteen leftist political figures were executed over the course of three days in front of his headquarters in Fort Zeelandia- events now known as the “December Murders.”
Shortly after the coup, Bouterse fought a civil war against a large contingent of afro-Surinamese living in the interior of Suriname and gained short-lived popularity. By the 90s, Bouterse had lost popular support and removed himself from politics. This was followed by a period of devastating economic mismanagement. In 1997, atfer almost ten years of heavy government spending and declining public services, the Surinamese government was confronted with high unemployment, disgruntled foreign investors, high inflation, and perpetually increasing poverty. With the current government’s support at an all-time low, Bouterse saw his chance. In an attempt to reinvigorate the Surinamese economy, Bouterse allied with his former enemy, afro-Surinamese leader, Ronnie Brunswijk,(ii) forming a political bloc strong enough to overthrow the incumbent party. His economic platform called for a re-envisioning of the foreign investment climate, and advocated strongly for increased trade with the Chinese, whose non-interventionist policies drew attention from the political contention of Bouterse’s human rights abuses. By 2010, with the assistance of the afro-Surinamese votes made possible by the coalition with Brunswijk, Bouterse was elected president of Suriname.
Meanwhile, allegations of drug trafficking led to the in absentia conviction of President Bouterse by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison and a $2.3 million fine “for running a cocaine smuggling ring” in Suriname.(iii) The lack of an extradition treaty between the two nations makes the sentencing legally impossible insofar as Bouterse remains in Suriname.(iv,v)
Bouterse’s legal protection runs deep in Suriname. Yet another attempt to bring Bouterse to justice backfired when a key witness in the December Murders decided to step forward. On the day of his testimony, the Surinamese parliament passed an amnesty law for the 24 suspected members of the December Murders, including Bouterse. The referendum of amnesty barred any criminal action taken against the perpetrators of the December Murders and the Surinamese Civil War. Shortly thereafter, a larger scale campaign for justice was initiated by many international human rights organizations (including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), calling for a retraction of the law and a trial for Bouterse.
In response to the referendum, the Netherlands acrimoniously suspended all foreign aid entering the country. Their new policy—essentially “smoke-em-out” economics—culminated in the dissolution of a decades-long bilateral aid agreement between the two countries, an estimated 20 million euros per year, which made up a substantial percentage of Surinamese spending on public services as well as funding for Non-Governmental Organizations. In reply, Bouterse forwent Latin Americathe option to name an ambassador to The Hague. In an address at the 37th annual Surinamese independence celebrations, Bouterse declaimed, “The time when we had to answer to the people on the North Sea is over. We understand that our diplomatic representation in the Netherlands needs to be reinforced and we have already studied a few options. However, we will retain relations on the level of a charge des affairs.”(vi)
The actions of the Netherlands reflect a greater pattern in an increasingly conservative foreign policy agenda. In 1986, the Netherlands, with support from the United States, nearly launched an invasion of Suriname to arrest Bouterse.(vii) In the post-9/11 world, the Dutch have shifted their foreign policy to reflect an increased attention to “political will...and the degree to which countries enjoy peace and security”(viii) and the political complications created by the slippery “relationship between development policy and security.”(ix) Exemplifying the complications of such a policy, Foreign Afairs Minister Maxime Verhagen agreed to “business relations,” but, in regards to Bouterse, he emphasized, “he is not welcome [in the Netherlands], except to serve his sentence.”(x)
As one of the biggest supporters of developmental aid the world over, the government of the Netherlands contributes 4.6 billion euros annually “towards the development of partner countries”(xi) in pursuit of the eight Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, the Netherlands is increasing the scope of its aid policies, aligning development aid criteria with “humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and impendence...” so as to protect “humanitarian aid from being equated with politics.”(xii) The double standard the Netherlands holds Suriname to is emblematic of its new position on foreign politics: security and justice before development. While this tactic makes more sense in countries on the verge of, or entrenched in, conflict, the post-conflict society of Suriname would be better served through apolitical developmental aid and building the capacity of local NGOs. Ideological determination towards international justice undermines the many factors that contribute to an equitable society.
The dissolution of the Surinamese/Dutch aid agreement presents a number of potentially harmful scenarios for the most disadvantaged of Suriname’s population. Suriname is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere with roughly 27% of the population surviving on $2 a day, 16% of the population subsisting on $1.25 a day, and 7% multi-dimensionally poor as defined by the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).(xiii) Despite multiple attempts to address the issue, unemployment has caused stagnation in all other dimensions of Surinamese life. The public suffers from poverty and unemployment, the Surinamese government spends a large component of public resources maintaining its power over the country, and the private sector is devoid of adequate investment capital due to the bureaucratic maze institutionalized by the government. Mining remains a ubiquitous component of economic activity, but low job security, gender imbalance, and the dangers associated with working in the interior ensures only a fraction of the population participates in this type of work.
What then keeps the country’s economy functioning? With almost “a one for one” ratio of Surinamese in Suriname to those of Surinamese ancestry in the Netherlands, remittances to the country are substantial. In fact, the IMF found in 2012 that public investment, “buoyed by strong activity in the oil and gold sectors,” has had a substantial effect on the state of the economy.(xiv) These findings, however, also showed remittances were not reducing poverty within the country because the investment climate in Suriname was not suitable for generating new capital. This suggests that additional aid revenue for domestic infrastructure has the potential to address both the need for initial investment in sustainable infrastructure and employment for the poor.
In 2001, the Surinamese drafted and adopted the Multi-annual Development Plan (MDP 2001-2005), which shifted its trade goals away from economic self-sufficiency and towards new policy objectives. The plan advocated for increased work in “macroeconomic stability, reduction of poverty through economic growth and the creation of employment, creation of a climate conducive to private sector development, and sustainable development and protection of the environment.”(xv) The Multi-annual Development Plan proposed the intervention of sustainable economic growth with considerations to those in poverty. However, with Dutch foreign aid at a standstill, it remains to be seen whether or not this project will continue.
It is unlikely that the withholding of Dutch Aid will have a significant effect on Bouterse. Chinese investment will insure that enough liquid capital exists in the country to maintain the status quo. The Dutch, on the other hand, stand to lose somewhat their image as bastions of internal justice, being the power most likely to resolve the conflict, and yet wholly unable to do so. To Bouterse’s credit, he has resolved many of the ethnic problems that faced his country and made progress against the inflation that had grown since the 1990s. In his older years, he has shown stubborn yet less brash behavior, and this, if anything, guarantees a somewhat peaceful Surinamese society. Bouterse would be wise to remain where he is, managing the only country he has left. The Dutch would be wise to consider all policy avenues for international aid intervention.
i. Wilkinson, Bert. Diplomatic War Between the Netherlands and Suriname Continues. The New York Amsterdam News. November 22 – November 28, 2012.
ii. Ramdharie, Stieven. “Enorme Winst Voor Bouterse in Suriname. “Volkskrant-nl.”
iii. “Suriname strongman guilty of drug charge.” Chicago Tribune News.
iv. Romero, Simon, “Returned to power, a leader celebrates a checkered past.” Te New York Times.
v. Romero, Simon. Long memories may ensnare a dictator. Te New York Times.
vi. Wilkinson. Diplomatic War.
vii. “The Netherlands planned U.S.-supported invasion of Suriname in 1986.” BNO News.
viii. The Development Policy of the Netherlands. Government of the Netherlands.
ix. Lopes Cadozo, The hidden crisis: armed conflict and education: Dutch aid to education and conflict. Education for All Global Monitoring Report. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
x. Government of the Netherlands, Development Policy.
xi. Ibid.
xii. Aid for people in need. Policy Framework for Humanitarian Aid. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
xiii. Country Briefing: Suriname. Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) At A Glance July 2010. Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). University of Oxford Press 2010.
xiv. Dwarkasing, Malty Shanti-Devi. Government Debt and Sustainable Development in Suriname: An assessment of the effect of the debt and the macroeconomic stability in 2008-2012 on human development indicators. Bureau Voor de Stattsschuld. Suriname Debt Management Office. Paramaribo.
xv. Trade Policy Review: Suriname. Trade Policy Regime: Framework and Objectives. World Trade Organization (2004).
